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Abstract
Relationship Based Access Control (ReBAC) has emerged as a popular alternative to
traditional access control models, such as Role Based Access Control (RBAC) and At-
tribute Based Access Control (ABAC). However, some of the model's aspects, such as
its expression language and delegation abilities have not been studied in depth. Further-
more, existing ReBAC models cater to single policy control, thus not taking into account
cases were many access control policies might apply to a single access control object.
We propose a ReBACmodel, set theoretic ReBac (STReBAC), which bases its expression
language on set theory. Our model is expressive and exible, catering to the above
problems, and able to overcome access control challenges as discussed by popular ReBAC
models without needing to alter its formal grammar.
Additionally, we extend our model to handle situations where more than one policy ap-
plies to the same access control object. To achieve this we have combined our STReBAC
model with PTaCL which is an evaluation framework for ABAC. We provide a solution
which is compatible with many industrial standards, such as eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) and Ponder, and formalise techniques used by those very
standards to extend our model without sacricing its original exibility.
As part of our research, we implement a demonstrator that proves how our formal model
can be applied to real life industrial problems, whether as a stand alone project or as part
of a larger access control mechanism. To demonstrate the above, we implement our model
in terms of Application Programming Interface (API)s that are widely used by today's
industry. This shows that our STReBAC models can be translated into implementations
which are exible and scalable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Preserving the privacy of sensitive information is of great importance to our society, and
is even more important given recent security breaches [45]. Organisations whose oper-
ation traditionally depends on safeguarding classied information, such as the military,
have always employed a number of protective measures in order to deal with poten-
tial security threats. These measures comprise the protection of sensitive information
(prevention), the detection of information leak (detection), and the recovery of lost or
corrupted sensitive information (recovery) [25]. With the rapid evolution of information
technology (IT), and its inclusion in every aspect of our lives, physical data eventually
gave way to digital data and security measures were adopted by the world of IT. There
are many ways to secure data ranging from security infrastructure and getting the right
level of security [3].
Ensuring the privacy of data in selected systems is a wide area of research, which covers
how the data is collected and stored into business processes as well as the management
of the conguration of IT infrastructure. The scope of the thesis is the eld of policy
languages in access control. In the world of IT, access control is the process of regulat-
ing access requests aimed towards sensitive information, based on a set of security rules.
Since access control operates on the forefront of information regulation, it is safe to say
1
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that access control predominantly operates on the protection of sensitive information.
An access control model, is a formal representation of access control which comprises a
set of functions needed to regulate access to protected information. In this thesis we will
contribute to the denition of access control models inspired by social networks in order
to address the weaknesses and the adaptability of existing models. In this introduction we
motivate the need for new access control models by reecting briey on existing models.
To the best of our knowledge, Lampson et al. [57] was the rst to formally model access
control by dening the access matrix in the 1970s. The access matrix is a two-dimensional
matrix that originally employed domains as row headers, and objects as column headers.
Each domain's subject's permissions, which represented a domain's access rights on a
particular object, could be found in the cell intersecting the domain's row with the
object's column. With time, more exible versions of the access matrix appeared in
the literature [46], [13] and [84], and the term domain was replaced by the term subject.
Today, the term subject mostly refers to human users, but there are cases where a subject
may represent a programming process or a computer system. Similarly, an object may
represent anything, depending on a business's nature (e.g., in a social network, an object
can represent a subject, or it may represent a digital resource).
The access matrix, and its simple approach to the subject-object-access rights triplet,
has served as a foundation for every access control model proposed by academic re-
search to date. Typically, the rst access control models to emerge were divided in
two categories: Discretionary Access Control (DAC) based models, where subjects may
own objects and are allowed to assign permissions to objects at their own discretion
and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) based models, where subjects do not own any
objects, and access requests are regulated by a central administrative authority. This
authority was either a human user or a machine programmed to operate based on a set
of security policies, which we will discuss in more detail in Section 2.2. One of the most
popular DAC models to date, is the Access Control Lists (ACL) model [76]. ACL is a
3Figure 1.1: The user/role/permissions triplet as introduced by RBAC [25]
collection of lists, with the head of each list being an object and the body comprising
subject/access right pairs. DAC is popular in situations where subjects have ownership
of objects, and enjoy the freedom of passing their access rights to other subjects. Two
popular solutions that have implemented DAC are the Windows and UNIX operating sys-
tems. They do so by allowing subjects to congure ACL in order to manage permissions
to their resources.
The most popular MAC [12] model to date, is the Multi Level Security (MLS) [79] model
based on the Belle-LaPadula model [76]. MLS employs a partially ordered set of security
labels. Each subject and object is assigned a security label. Subjects are allowed to
write to objects that are assigned a security label which is equal to or higher than the
subject's label. MLS's central administrative authority and lack of subject ownership has
made it a perfect candidate for organisations that rely heavily on security, such as the
military [87].
Both DAC and MAC models, however, were never designed with a large number of
subjects in mind. As more and more businesses turned towards IT solutions, models
depending on DAC and MAC were hard pressed to deal with the increased number of
business users [25].
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [75] emerged as an alternative solution, that com-
bined the best of DAC and MAC. Unlike previous models, which dealt by directly as-
sociating subjects to permissions, RBAC introduced the concept of a role. Figure 1.1
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shows how a role acts as an intermediary between subjects and permissions. In doing so,
it relieves administrators from the burden of maintaining numerous access control lists,
while still being able to deliver ne-grained access control. RBAC was avidly embraced
by the access control community, and it remains one of the most popular access control
models to date.
However, as is the case with any model, RBAC is not without its drawbacks. Dhamija et
al.'s work gives a list of identity management aws commonly found in access control
models [34]. For example, an RBAC system's administrator needs to constantly monitor
the system for any changes in its subject database. These changes need to be reected
in the user-role assignment - users that have been made redundant, need to be removed
from their roles. New users need to be assigned to a role (or roles) in order to be
able to access objects in the system. Quite often, an RBAC system administrator will
need to maintain two or more roles that are very similar to one another, a problem
refered to as role explosion. For example, a medical practice requires that its patients'
healthcare les can only be read by each patient's personal physician. The practice's
administrators would be forced to create a role for each physician in the practice, which
would result in a number of roles with near-identical functionality. Finally, despite RBAC
being neither a DAC or a MAC model, it still revolves around the concept of central
administration. Of course there may be more than one administrator, and subjects may
have ownership of objects, nevertheless administration is still needed to assign users to
roles, and roles to permissions. Such problems become more evident in networks that
exhibit two properties:
• Are subject driven - subjects own objects, and subjects may oer access rights
to their objects to other subjects. They do not require a central administrative
authority.
• Grow fast in size - new subjects join the networks in a very fast rate. Examples
of such networks are peer to peer networks [67] and le sharing networks.
5To accommodate these new types of networks, the research community attempted changes
to the original RBAC specication in the form of role hierarchies [74] and policy tem-
plates [61], as well as introduced new, more exible access control models (in Section 2.9
we will provide a detailed discussion of the workarounds attempted to deal with the RBAC
model's shortcomings) . Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) [88] is a recent access
control model, which uses attribute/value pairs to regulate access requests on subject
objects. ABAC relies on conditional statements that evaluate a subject's access rights
based on a subject's attributes. A subject's attributes and its value represent a par-
ticular subject quality. For example, an attribute/value pair could be `name=John', or
`profession=engineer'. A subject's attribute/value pairs are attached to a subject's access
request, and used as input to ABAC conditional statements.
Another example is Role Attribute Based Access Control (RABAC) [50], which is a hy-
brid model based on RBAC and ABAC. It combines RBAC's and ABAC's strongest
points by maintaining some of the users-role-permission functionality, and incorporating
it into the existing attribute/value architecture. RABAC's main contribution is to try
and deal with RBAC's role explosion problem. Both ABAC and RABAC, however, base
their operation on boolean operations between users (i.e., a user either has an attribute
associated with him/her, or they do not. This is very similar to how RBAC model works,
where a user either belongs in a role or not). User-driven networks are dened based
on the relations between their user members, making a boolean access control model
inadequate for capturing complex relational expressions (i.e., a friend of a friend can be
satised by following many dierent `friend' paths between the same two users).
A strongly emerging access control model is Relationship Based Access Control (Re-
BAC) [39], [19] and [26]. ReBAC allows subjects to create binary relations with other
subjects, and then dene relational security policies that regulate access to the policy
owners' objects. The major dierence between RBAC and ReBAC is that ReBAC uses
binary relations between users as the basis for its security policies, relations that can
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be combined to form more complex relational patterns. The absence of roles allows for
more abstract policy denitions that seamlessly adapt to network changes. These policies
may span any degree of separation between subjects, that is the number of subjects in a
chain of relations, and may reach an access control decision based both on the relations
involved as well as the trust ratio of a particular relation between two subjects. For ex-
ample, a subject A having established a friendship relation with a subject B may assign
that relation a trust ratio of 40%. Subject B, however, may assign the same relation a
trust ratio of 60%. One of the goals of our thesis is to examine the various ReBAC mod-
els, and discuss their relative strengths and weaknesses, and to propose a exible policy
language able to represent complex relational patterns. Our focus will be on relational
models that do not use trust ratios.
1.1 Research Challenges
So far we have given a very brief introduction to the dierent kinds of access control
models. We want to be able to deal with dynamic networks that have localised authority
and we explained that RBAC models provide central control. We explained that ReBAC
models oer the potential of being able to dene more abstract policies that are more
adaptable to change with localised authority. Our research questions are thus focused on
the following:
1. Do existing ReBAC models provide a clear way for designers of systems to express
formalising binary relations between subjects, to be able to dene security policies
based on the relations, and to be able evaluate these polices in order to reach an
access control decision?
2. Are existing ReBAC models dened in terms of a formal basis that is as simple as
possible?
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3. Will using ReBAC models alone be enough to be able to express complex access
control policies, or will they need to be combined with other access control models?
4. How easy is it to map ReBAC models to implementations which are based on
industrial access control languages?
In order to address these research questions we focus on analysing existing policy lan-
guages and consequently contribute towards a formal policy language that, as identied
by the original Ponder specication [32], satises the following requirements:
1. Provides support for security policies for access control, and delegation to cater for
temporary transfer of access rights to agents acting on behalf of a client as well as
policies to express management activity.
2. Oers structuring techniques to facilitate the specication of policies relating to
large systems with millions of objects. This implies the need for policies relating
to collections of objects rather than individual ones.
3. Allows for composite policies which allow the basic security and management poli-
cies relating to roles, to organisational units and to specic applications to be
grouped. Composite policies are essential to cater for the complexity of policy
administration in large enterprise information systems.
4. It must be possible to analyse policies for conicts and inconsistencies in the spec-
ication. In addition it should be possible to determine which policies apply to an
object or what objects a particular policy applies to. Declarative languages make
such analysis easier.
5. Is extensible and able to cater for new types of policy that may arise in the future
and this can be supported by inheritance in an object-oriented language.
6. The language must be comprehensible and easy to use by policy users.
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1.2 Contributions
The research of this thesis yields three contributions, which are explained as follows:
A unied formal language for ReBAC { this contribution addresses the rst two
research questions. Following the success of social networks, such as Facebook [69]
and Google+ [51], ReBAC has gained in popularity as an access control model.
Fong et al. [39] denes a formal language that allows for bi-directional subject rela-
tions, inclusive of context ltering. Context ltering allows for certain relations to
be activated or deactivated based on the set of active contexts, not too dissimilar
to RABAC's policy ltering. Fong's language however is not based on a formal
standard. Carminati et al. [19] use OWL [62] and SWRL [47] to capture subject
relations, as well as allow subjects to oer their object permissions to other sub-
jects. However, as Carminati acknowledges, OWL/SWRL are hard to formalize
and unable to evaluate multiple security policies for the same object. We provide a
more detailed comparison of these two approaches in Chapter 2. While each policy
language success to address its own research aims they do not provide a relationship
based access control model that allows multiple policies to be combined and eval-
uated. Therefore our rst contribution is to dene a new set theoretic relationship
based access control model, referred to as set theoretic ReBac (STReBAC), which
provides a consistent and unied notation that denes a range of policies. The
model can be used to regulate access control to systems whose policies are dened
in terms of relationships [7]. The inspiration for the model came from Online Social
Networks but the model we propose is more widely applicable to systems that are
not just exemplars of social networks. ReBAC models simply provide an easy way
to access the assets/resources within a system. Therefore, our contribution to a
new ReBAC model becomes relevant when the notion of relationships becomes part
of the access control mechanism of a system.
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A hybrid ABAC/ReBAC model { this second contribution addresses the third re-
search question. We have already mentioned RABAC, which is a hybrid RBAC/ABAC
model. RABAC was created to deal with RBAC's role explosion problem, a situ-
ation where two or more nearly identical roles need to be maintained to ensure
that particular subjects have access to particular objects (e.g., a medical patient's
le is only readable by the patient's doctor). RBAC's role system, though useful
for grouping together users to roles, suers from lack of ne-grained access con-
trol. RABAC tries to solve this by incorporating RBAC roles as part of ABAC's
attribute/value model and partially succeeds. However, this approach is in essence
trying to encode a binary relation between two users into a parametrised role.
Inspired by RABAC, we then focus on integrating our STReBAC language with an
existing ABAC based language, proposing an even more exible model than ReBAC
- one that incorporates ReBAC's into ABAC's world of attribute/value pairs. This
hybrid model is novel, because there is a clear separation of concerns between the
relationships and attribute/value pairs in the access control model. The model
also includes a very clear evaluation framework so that more than one policy can
be evaluated for each object. In this new model, we demonstrate STReBAC's
exibility by extending our language to operate on multiple networks. We take
into account two cases. dIn the rst case, the networks operate on the same set
of relational types, whereas in the second case they operate on dierent sets of
relational types.
Implementing a self-contained ReBAC module { this third contribution addresses
the fourth research question. With the exception of D-FOAF [54], which provided
an add-on ReBAC implementation, we are not aware of an implementation on any
of the existing ReBAC models. D-FOAF provides a basic ReBAC access con-
trol implementation based on separation of degree between subjects, and relational
trust ratios but does not oer a means to declare and instantiate complicated user
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relations. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, it bases its operation on a
single type of relations - the friendship relation. We believe there is ground for a
stronger implementation, one that allows for more relation types as well as more
complicated security polices.
Thus our nal contribution is an implementation of our STReBAC model and
their evaluation using combining algorithms.We implement a proof of concept to
show that we can turn our abstract STReBAC that we evaluate using combing
algorithms into an implementation based on eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [43]. The important research output here is the demonstration
that XACML did not need to change to deal with the new binary relationships and
by coding this up we illustrate this.
The implementation operates as a stand-alone system with a user interface, allowing
subjects to create and police resources based on the hybrid attribute and relation-
ship based access control model. The implementation demonstrates that the the-
oretical models can be implemented in a web service system implementation. The
architecture of the implementation is such that it produces a number of web Ap-
plication Programming Interface (API), inclusive of Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP) [65], Representational State Transfer (REST) [11] and XACML [43] func-
tionality so that the implementation of our theoretical access control model may
easily be integrated to any existing system wishing to add an extra layer of access
control based on relationship control. These APIs could be reused outside the
scope of the proof of concept system that we implemented. The proof of concept
does not claim to be the most ecient implementation, it serves to illustrate that
our hybrid access control model we propose can be implemented in code and utilised
within a service oriented architecture.
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1.3 Methodology
The methodology adopted in the thesis will be to conduct an evaluation of existing
techniques, then propose a new technique which we then validate. We are not performing
verication on the proposed access control model, rather we are going to implement the
proposed model as the third contribution to the thesis. The implementation provides
validation of the enhanced capabilities that the relationship model combined with an
attribute based model provides. The enhanced capabilities is the use of localised authority
to enable the new access control model to be adaptable when the systems of interest
change with respect to the relationships they need to maintain.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of our thesis is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2, we discuss popular access control models, elaborate on the subject of
delegation and what it means in our model. Along with the theoretical introduction,
the chapter also introduces implementation frameworks that deal with access control. In
particular we consider XACML and other popular alternatives. This chapter provides
the background to demonstrate that there is a research gap in the extant literature since
there are weaknesses in the extant access control models when they are evaluated against
the requirements set out by Ponder [32] which we introduced in Section 1.1.
In Chapter 3, we discuss a real life scenario that demonstrates a frequent need for de-
ploying a exible, fast-growing information network, in which the semantic information
needs a level of access control. The chapter uses RBAC and ReBAC to specify appro-
priate security policies for the scenario. The chapter provides a critical evaluation of
the uses of RBAC and ReBAC, explaining why ReBAC is preferable to RBAC in this
particular scenario. This chapter is included since it provides a running example that
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serves to launch the access control model that will form the basis of our contribution will
be a relationship based access control model.
In Chapter 4, we present STReBAC as our contribution of a new ReBAC model and
provides our rst research contribution. We dene a number of dierent policy templates,
each used to approach a dierent problem. We use the scenario of Chapter 3 to illustrate
the concepts to be introduced.
In Chapter 5, we discuss the extended version of STReBAC, and introduce a hybrid
notation that deals with the shortcomings of our original formal attempt. This chapter
provides our second research contribution.
In Chapter 6, we present a working implementation for STReBAC.Section 6.2 gives an
overview of our implementation and the technologies we have used to implement our
formal contributions. This chapter provides our third research contribution.
Finally, in Chapter 7, we summarise our ndings, and discuss potential future work that
could further extend our research.
1.5 Publications
In the course of our research, we have published the following papers which provide a
description of our work's results:
• Evangelos Aktoudianakis, Jason Crampton, Steve Schneider, Helen Treharne, Adrian
Waller: Policy templates for relationship-based access control. 11th International
Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), pp 221-228, July 2013.
• Evangelos Aktoudianakis: A unied approach to dene social networks and their
policies , in 11th Annual PhD conference (CompConf 2013), Department of Com-
puting, University of Surrey 2013
Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we dene the concepts of access control, security policies and delegation.
We have already introduced the concept of regulating access to assets and resources in
Chapter 1 and given a brief overview of dierent access control models. In this chapter
we review the eld more systematically so that the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the dierent methods are noted. Their comparison serves to underpin the identication
of a research gap in the literature which is that the access control models that exist
focus on the ability to regulate access using one mechanism and that more work is
needed in order to provide an access control mechanism that allows for the combined
use of dierent control mechanisms. Finally, we conclude the chapter with reference to
industry frameworks used to implement access control systems and compare their relative
strengths and weaknesses. This is included because our goal in Chapters 4 and 5 is to
dene an access control mechanism that can then be realised in terms of one of these
industry frameworks without the need to adapt the industry frameworks.
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2.2 Access Control and Security Policies
The Internet Security Glossary [77] denes access control as follows:
`Access control is a process by which use of system resources is regulated ac-
cording to a security policy and is permitted only by authorized entities (users,
programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy'
Similarly, a security policy [77] is dened as follows:
`A security policy may comprise a set of policy rules (or principles) that direct
how a system (or an organization) provides security services to protect sen-
sitive and critical system resources. Access control is integral for regulating
access to sensitive information, which we will be referring to as objects, by a
system's users, which we will be referring to as subjects.'
In a multi-user computer system, subjects can be users of a system, or programs running
under a user's active account. Objects can be les, or even other subjects. If access
control is the process by which access is regulated, and security policies are the tools for
such regulation, then an access control model is a combination of the two. In this thesis
an access control model is considered to be a security service because it is a mechanism
that can be applied to provide security. An access control model typically denes a
collection of sets, functions and relations that represent elements of an access control
mechanism [28]. Sets usually represent collections of subjects and objects, relations are
ways to map subjects to objects (i.e, roles in RBAC, attribute-value pairs in ABAC,
binary relations in ReBAC), while functions are used to map together subjects, objects
and relations. To the best of our knowledge, the rst formal attempt to describe access
control arrived in the form of the access matrix by Lampson et al. [57]. The access
matrix's original concept determined whether a domain had access to a resource. Its
simple yet eective approach was based on the following function: subject  object 
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accessrights ! f0; 1g where a 3-tuple is evaluated to true or false (i.e access or no
access) and this has served as the basis for every access control model. Various attempts
have been made to formalise access control into what has been dened as access control
models. If access control regulates access requests, an access control model denes the
way such requests are evaluated.
2.3 Delegation
The concept of delegation, where one subject passes his objects' permissions to an-
other subject for a variable amount of time, has been widely investigated in litera-
ture [29], [85], [44], [41] and [59]. The passer of permissions is called a delegator, while
the recipient of permissions is called the delegate. According to Crampton et al. [29]
delegation may occur in two forms: user delegation and administrative delegation. User
delegation is dened by a subject passing object permissions he possesses to another sub-
ject (it is assumed that the user owns the object). Administrative delegation is dened
by a subject passing object permissions he does not possess himself to another subject.
Crampton further divides delegation in two sub-classications: granted and transferable.
Granted delegation takes place when a subject makes a copy of his object permissions
and passes them to another subject. Transferred delegation takes place when a subject
passes his actual object permissions to another subject, while having them removed from
himself. A delegator and a delegate may be human users, machine entities, or even
processes. Our work focuses on human to human delegation because ReBAC systems
are user-driven, but we would like to mention existing research on machine to machine
delegation [41] and process to process delegation [85]. The latter two are more popular
in MAC based systems, where access control decisions are made by central administrative
authorities, which more than often are programs or machines. Crampton's concepts of
granted and transferable delegation apply to both machine and process type delegations.
Finally, Varadharajan's work also mentions the need for delegate trustworthiness, that
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is for the access control system to trust in delegates being who they say they are.
2.4 Access Matrix
In Section 2.2 above we mentioned the Access Matrix (AM) [76]. An AM is a two-
dimensional matrix, which acts as the basis of modern access models. Unlike Tolone et
al. [84], according to whom subjects are users and objects are resources, we prefer D.
Elliot's et al.'s [13] approach, according to whom objects can represent any entity eligible
for access control (e.g., another user, a le, or a device to name but a few). Our reasoning
for preferring the latter, more generic approach, is the diversity of an object's concept
in today's world. With the rise of social media and mobile devices, the term object has
escaped the narrow connes of a resource. An object can represent a subject in a social
network, or a Bluetooth device that asks for a connection. Cells in an AM dene whether
or not a subject has permission to perform an action on an object (e.g., a cell X of row
A, and column B displays the permissions of subject A on object B).
An AM formally comprises a set of subjects S, a set of objects O, and a set of access
rights AR. A function accFunct : SO ! AR evaluates a subject's or an object's set of
permissions. In order for a subject s 2 S to have access to an object o 2 O, the following
must be true: accFunc(o)  accFunc(s).
Figure 2.1 is a graphical representation of an access matrix. This concept, where subjects
are assigned permissions to objects, stays true to access control as we have described it in
Section 2.2: a subject requesting access to an object needs to prove he has the appropriate
permissions to do so.
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Figure 2.1: A simple access matrix. Note how each cell represents a particular user's
access rights to a particular object.
2.5 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory
Access Control(MAC)
Access control models are divided, based on how permissions are granted to subjects,
in two categories - DAC models, and MAC models. Both models are based on simi-
lar concepts, so we will be discussing them together in this section, starting with DAC.
According to the trusted computer system evaluation criteria (TCSEC) [58], [76] (often
referred to as the Orange Book), DAC is `a means of restricting access to objects based
on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are discre-
tionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access permission is capable of passing
that permission (perhaps indirectly) onto any other subject (unless restrained by manda-
tory access control)'. In DAC, subjects may delegate their particular object permissions
to other subjects. In Section 2.3 we noted that this concept of one subject (delegator)
passing permissions to another (delegate) is called delegation. This exible approach,
however, has proven weak against a variety of security attacks which take advantage of
programs running under a subject's active account, the most prominent of which is the
Trojan Horse attack [80].
In the case of a Trojan Horse attack, a malevolent user may manipulate a resource owner's
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access rights in order to gain access to sensitive information.To better understand this,
consider an example where a user, Bob, owns a sensitive resource named O. Bob assigns
the 'READ' permission for himself on O. Bob trusts another user, Alice, and when Alice
oers Bob a utility program, Bob accepts and runs it. However, and unbeknown to Bob,
Alice wishes to gain `READ' access to Bob's sensitive O le. In order to do so, a hidden
function (trojan horse) in Alice's utility performs the following steps:
1. It creates a new resource, O0, and saves it in Alice's 'READ' space.
2. It grants 'WRITE' access to Bob on O0.
3. Finally ,it copies O's contents into O0, thus granting Alice access to the original
le's contents.
Given how the resource's original owner could have his 'READ' rights exploited in such
a fashion, it is easy to see that the more delegates are granted 'READ' access to a le in
a DAC system, the greater the danger would be for the le to leak to malevolent users.
Despite such vulnerabilities, DAC has been widely adopted by a multitude of systems,
some of the most notable being the Microsoft Windows le system, and the UNIX le
system.
MAC [12], based on the Bell-LaPadula [76] model, works on the basis of administrative-
driven permissions assignment. Unlike DAC, where subjects can delegate their object
permissions to other subjects, MAC systems use a central administrative authority to
assign permissions to objects. Subjects are neither allowed to dene their own permis-
sions on any an object, including the ones they own, or delegate their permissions to
other subjects. MAC security controls are system enforced and cannot be changed by
subjects or programs running under a subject's account [81]. Because of its tight control
over permissions assignment, MAC has been adopted by many military organizations,
where leaked information could severely impact their structure and compromise their
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personnel's safety. In the next sections we will discuss some of the more popular MAC
and DAC implementations.
2.6 Access Control Lists and Capability Lists
One way to implement the AM, is by implementing ACL and Capability Lists (CL) [76],
[84]. An Access Control List is, essentially, a list that comprises an object as its head and
every subject who has permissions on the object as its body. Figure 2.2 illustrates a simple
Access Control List. Since subjects in ACL are not allowed to delegate their permissions
to other subjects, it is safe to assume that they follow a MAC model approach.
Figure 2.2: A simple access control list. Subjects and their rights are organised per
object.
Access Control Lists associate each le to a list of subject/permission pairs. In this
example John and Alice have permissions on File 1, whereas John, Alice and Michael
have permissions on File 2. The way Access Control Lists are organised makes it easy
to retrieve every subject associated with a object. Determining or changing a particular
subject's permissions, however, is a more challenging task. To do the former, a system
administrator needs to iterate through every system le, which can be a tedious and
object heavy process in a large system. To do the latter, the easiest approach would be
to simply delete the subject account in question. Doing so, however, would raise the need
to recreate the subject account in question and reassign appropriate permissions to the
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subject.
Figure 2.3: A simple capability list. Unlike with access control lists, which are organised
around a system's objects, capability lists are organised around a system's subjects.
Capability Lists base their structure around subjects instead, as shown in Figure 2.3.
They prioritise subjects over objects when it comes to structuring a system. They share
the same strengths and weaknesses as an access control list, in that it is easy to nd
every resource a subject is associated to but it is much harder to nd all the subjects
that have access rights to a particular resources.
2.7 Multi-Level security
MLS [12], [79] and [73], based on the Belle-LaPadula [76] model,is a MAC model, which
works on the basis of security levels. Each subject and object in a system is assigned a
security level. The security level associated with an object reects the sensitivity of the
information stored within the object while the security level associated with a subject
reects the subject's trustworthiness in the system. A common set of security levels
consists of: Top Secret (TS), Secret (S), Condential (C) and Unclassied (U) with TS
being the highest and U being the lowest. In a MLS system, administrators have complete
control over assigning security labels on both subjects and objects - as such, delegation
is not supported. MLS systems operate on the following two principles:
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• A subject can write on a object of the same or higher security level as he possesses
(otherwise known as No Write Down (NWD)).
• A subject can read a object of the same or lower security level as he possesses
(otherwise known as No Read Up (NRU)).
Figure 2.4: An MLS system
Consider Figure 2.4. To better understand how security levels work, consider the follow-
ing: a subject who possesses an (S) security level is also able to log onto the system with
any security level that is dominated by his current one (e.g., in our example those levels
would be (C) and (U)). He is allowed to read all resources of security level (S) or lower,
and is able to write on resources that are of levels (S) or (TS), despite being unable to
read the latter. In order to avoid accidental corruption of data, some MLS implementa-
tions disallow a subject from writing on resources with domineering security labels, thus
only allowing subjects to write on resources with the same security level as the subject's
current one. Because of its strict security rules, MAC has served as the basis of access
control models employed by military and security organizations worldwide. Despite being
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stronger than DAC in terms of security, MAC and MLS have displayed vulnerabilities of
their own. In particular, John McLean [63] argued that the Bell-LaPadula model was not
adequate by developing `System Z', an access control model based on the Bell-LaPadula
denitions. With System Z, every time a read or write request was formulated, all objects
and subjects were downgraded to the lowest security label, thus making read or write
possible without violating the security label format of the Bell-LaPadula model. In short,
System Z proved that despite the secure approach of NWD and NRU, the MLS model
did not prevent an attack, where every security label in the system was equalised.
2.8 FOAF - Friend of a Friend
Though not a policy language per se, Friend of a Friend (FOAF) [14] is the rst attempt
of semantically representing user information online. It is ocially dened as:
The FOAF project is creating a Web of machine-readable pages describing
people, the links between them and the things they create and do.
FOAF uses Ontology Web Languages (OWL) ontologies [35], [10] and Resource De-
scription Framework (RDF) [52] in order to publish web documents that describe users'
personal information, through encoding, exchange and reuse of structured metadata.
FOAF attempts to dene a standard in which users may dene information about them-
selves, as well as point to information of other users they are connected to. RDF uses the
concept of subject-object-predicate. A subject and an object can be virtually anything
(e.g. network users, les, email accounts), while the predicate denes the connection
between a subject and an object. By associating subjects to objects, FOAF creates an
information network of subject and objects, that can be traced for information. The
following is an example of how FOAF denes a person using OWL:
< f o a f : Person
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rd f : about="http ://www. l iyangyu . com/peopleLiyangYu"/>
<rd f :RDF
xmlns : rd f="http ://www.w3 . org /1999/02/22  rdf syntax ns"
xmlns : f o a f="http :// xmlns . com/ f o a f /0.1/">
< f o a f : Person>
< f o a f : name>Evan Aktoudianakis
</ f o a f : name>
< f o a f :mbox rd f : r e s ou r c e="mai l to : l iyang910@yahoo . com"/>
< f o a f : knows>
< f o a f : Person>
< f o a f :mbox rd f : r e s ou r c e="mai l to : connie@liyangyu . com"/>
</ f o a f : Person>
</ f o a f : knows>
</ f o a f : Person>
From the above we see how FOAF keywords are combined with XML to form what is
referred to as a FOAF dictionary. By dening listings like this, and connecting them
together (e.g., see the <knows> element of the above listing), users are able to dene
relationships to other users and objects. The circle of FOAF documents is created and
maintained by the following steps [14]:
1. A user creates a FOAF document, using a FOAF dictionary.
2. The user then links their home page to their FOAF document.
3. The FOAF organisation uses its crawler to visit the Web and collect all the FOAF
documents. In the context of the FOAF organisation, a crawler is called a scutter.
Its basic task is not much dierent from a crawler: it visits the Web and tries to
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nd RDF les. In this case, it has to nd a special kind of RDF le: a FOAF
document. Once it nds one, the least it will do is to parse the document and store
the triples into its data system for later use.
4. FOAF maintains a central repository and is also responsible for keeping the infor-
mation up to date. FOAF also has to maintain a centralized database to store all
the triples it has collected and other relevant information. To keep this database
up to date, it has to run the scutter periodically to visit the Web.
FOAF has been used extensively by Carminati (in Section 2.12) and D-FOAF [54]. Both
approaches extend FOAF to accommodate each models individual needs. Carminati has
used FOAF in combination with her access control models, to capture the relations
between the users of a network. D-FOAF augments the relationships with distance to
provide a ner grained relationship. In this thesis we will be concerned with evaluating
the relationships between users within an access control model to reach an access control
decision. We are not concerned with characterizing the relationship in detail; we abstract
away from this, and therefore extending FOAF is not applicable to us.
2.9 Role Based Access Control
RBAC [36] and [74] is closely related to the concept of ACL. The dierence between the
two approaches, is that roles act like intermediaries between subjects and permissions,
while ACL utilize the concept of access control lists, tying subjects and permissions
directly to objects. With RBAC, we no longer need to traverse the entire le system in
order to discover a subject's collective permissions. Instead, we query for the subject's
roles, then further query the resulting roles for the permissions associated to each role. In
that sense, roles can be thought of as job functions in an organisation. Instead of dening
security levels like labels, which we discussed in Section 2.7, roles describe a subject's
position in an organisation, as well as the organisational responsibilities a subject carries.
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Subjects may belong to many roles, and a role may be assigned to many subjects. Equally,
a role can be assigned many permissions, and a permission may be assigned to many
roles. The complexity of RBAC systems can be calculated using scale measuring. Scale
measuring depends on the number of roles used in a RBAC system. The larger the
number of roles and the number of subjects assigned to roles, the heavier the impact
on the RBAC system as far as timely performance is concerned. Initially, RBAC was
formally described as a tuple of subjects, roles and permissions. As security requirements
grew more complex, RBAC evolved in order to accommodate these changes. Finally,
RBAC supports delegation just as DAC does. Subjects may assign roles to other subjects,
provided the system administrators allow for such functionality. As of today, four dierent
versions of RBAC exist [78]:
• Flat - the original version of RBAC, where the simple triplet of subjects, roles and
permissions applied.
• Hierarchical - a version of RBAC which allows roles to inherit permissions from one
another.
• Constrained - a version of RBAC which allows certain constraints to be associated
with roles.
• Symmetrical - a version of RBAC that incorporates both the hierarchical and con-
strained models.
We have already discussed at RBAC in this section's introduction. We will now briey
discuss the hierarchical and constrained RBAC models, and conclude with the Symmet-
rical RBAC version which comprises all previous versions into one.
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2.9.1 Hierarchical RBAC
Role hierarchies are a natural means for structuring roles to reect an organization's lines
of authority and responsibility [74]. Consider for example a construction company that
comprises roles such as junior engineer, engineer, senior engineer. It is safe to assume
that once a junior engineer gets promoted to a normal engineer, he retains his original
set of privileges. It is also safe to assume, that his original set of privileges is amended
with new ones due to his promotion. By allowing roles to inherit permissions from one
another, role hierarchies eliminate repeatability in an RBAC system and, consequentially,
reduce the system's overall complexity (by using roles hierarchies, the number of actual
roles in a RBAC system gets reduced, thus providing with a smaller number in scale
measuring).
2.9.2 Constrained RBAC
Constraints [74] are a way to further control role eectiveness and assignments in a RBAC
system. The most common constraint used is `mutually exclusive roles', where two or
more roles cannot be concurrently assigned to the same subject. In an RBAC system
which is managed by a single administrator, `mutually exclusive roles' is a helpful tool in
the hands of the administrator - it ensures that the administrator does not accidentally
assign two conicting roles to the same subject. Alternatively, in a decentralised RBAC
system, where there are various ranks of administrators and moderators, constraints can
be used by the highest rank of administrators to restrict the roles that lower-level system
moderators can assign to other subjects. Another example of a role constraint, would be
`time restricted roles'. In this case, a role is only eective during a certain time of day.
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2.9.3 Symmetrical RBAC
Symmetrical RBAC [74], shown in Figure 2.5 combines at, hierarchical and constrained
RBAC in a single model. Subjects are assigned roles by system administrators. They are
awarded these roles when they log in the system and may use the permissions associated
with these roles for as long as their subject session lasts. These roles may inherit from
other roles, thus amending the set of subject permissions and every role in the system
is subject to constraints. These may include mutual exclusive roles, or time restrained
roles.
Figure 2.5: The hierarchical RBAC version [74].
Though not as secure as a strict MAC approach, RBAC provides adequate security
through the use of constraints. Role hierarchies and delegation allows a RBAC imple-
mentation subjects to administer their own objects, or pass authority over their objects
to other subjects, thus fully replicating DAC functionality. As such, it is safe to say that
RBAC is the natural evolution of an inclusive DAC/MAC solution, providing the end
subject with a clean and simple manners of administrating his objects. RBAC's major
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drawback, is the need to often replicate functionality by creating nearly identical roles
in order to cope with subtle changes in permission requirements. To better understand
this, consider the example of a hospital where doctors should only have access to their
personal patients' les. This requirement would only be one permission out of many
assigned to the role doctor, however it is impossible to use a single role in RBAC in order
to replicate the one-to-one doctor patient requirement. The way to resolve this, would
be to create a secondary role for each doctor, one that would inherit the primary doctor
role's permissions and would then be augmented with the one-to-one doctor/patient re-
quirement. This problem, called role-explosion, has been identied in the literature [27],
and has paved the way for the ABAC model.
2.10 Attribute Based Access Control
Unlike DAC, MAC and RBAC, where permissions are assigned to users, resources and
roles, ABAC works on the basis of attribute/value pairs that can be attached to sub-
jects, objects or the system environment itself [88]. Initially developed for securing access
to web-services [8], ABAC describes all information relevant to an access request using
attribute/value pairs and has also been adopted by the OASIS group for its XACML
implementation [43]. ABAC attributes may include a subject's identity, a subject's role,
a resource's name, etc., making ABAC inclusive of every popular access control model to
date. It is important to note, however, that despite allowing role attributes, ABAC does
not support the users-role-permissions triplet; in ABAC, role is yet another attribute. Ac-
cess decisions in ABAC are reached using decisions rules, conditions or constraints based
on the attribute/value pair architecture (e.g., similarly to RBAC constraints, whether a
user belongs in two roles, or the location from which a user logs onto the system from).
The major dierence between ACL, MLS, RBAC and ABAC is ABAC's unrestricted
approach to access control. To better illustrate this, consider the example of a security
company that wishes to enforce access rules on its les based on the les' sensitivity as
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well as the accessing user's trustworthiness. Table 2.1 displays the requirements in an
informal manner. We have intentionally allowed dierent combinations of users to have
File rating Users allowed to
read the le
Top Secret local CEO and external
CEOs
Secret Manager and local CEO
Condential Manager and Employee
and local CEO
Unclassied Manager and Employee
and local CEO
Table 2.1: A company's requirements for securing its data
access to dierent le ratings in order to demonstrate MAC's inability to deal with a
system that does not necessarily organise access in a logical structure. In this example,
top secret les can be accessed by the company's CEOs from any company branch, how-
ever les of secret rating, or less, should only be accessed by local CEOs, thus making
it impossible to use MLS's security level system. DAC, which allows users to pass their
rights to other users, poses a security risk for the particular scenario - if a local CEO's
account was compromised, they would be able to delegate the account's access rights to
any user or program they so chose. RBAC is able to implement a solution by creating
a role for each user in the system, and then assigning appropriate permissions to each
role. However as the company grows and more users are required to be registered in the
company, the strain on the system administrators increases. They need to monitor for
new users, and then assign them to the appropriate roles. Furthermore, if the company
introduces new roles (e.g., Secretary, Security ocer, etc. ) it falls onto the administra-
tors to both assign permissions and assign users to these new roles. ABAC, due to its
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attribute/value format, uses a conditional approach to evaluate access control. Instead
of querying for a user's roles, and then querying each role for the available permissions,
ABAC uses conditional statements such as `if a user is a CEO then they can read a top
secret le'. This conditional statement allows for ner-grained access control, because it
eliminates the necessity for roles, security levels and permission assignments. In fact, this
particular statement comprises a user's identity, his company role, and the permission
related to it without explicitly referring to a particular user.
2.11 Role Attribute Based Access Control
A RBAC system often needs to maintain a set of closely related roles in order to satisfy a
business' logical requirements (e.g. a banking system, where each customer should only
have access to their own account). The research community has worked extensively on
this problem, mostly by augmenting RBAC with user/resource specic attributes. Roles
acting as an intermediary between users and permissions simplify the process of under-
standing what permissions a user has. Roles still need to be set up prior to RABAC being
used. Constraints can be used to specify restrictions upon how roles can be assigned,
however
correctionthat does not help with the role explosion problem.
ABAC allows for dynamically changing attributes (such as the time of day, the time of
location). Attributes allow ner control over access control, but they can grow to be
rather numerous and complicated to manage for a simple user.
2.12 ReBAC
To the best of our knowledge, Gates et al. [42] was the rst to raise the need for an
access control model based on interpersonal relationships. This need came into existence
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in order to deal with RBAC weaknesses, as mentioned in Section 2.9. Fong et al. [39]
analyses RBAC's shortcomings when it comes to emerging application domains (e.g.,
healthcare, education) where a resource owner and an accessor are in some form of
a relation. RBAC's role system employs roles to connect users to permissions. This
approach does not work well in application domains where a subject's permissions are
dependent on the subject's relation to the object in question. Parameterized roles [60]
have provided a temporary solution by introducing functions that accept a subject as
input, and return a role as a result (e.g. doctor(Alice) would return the role taken by
Alice's doctors). As Fong et al. [39] states, this has pushed RBAC to its limits and has
not dealt fully with RBAC's main point of weakness - the role explosion problem.
Recall how in Chapter 1 we discussed subjects and objects as vital parts of an access
control model. In ReBAC, objects can represent virtually any part of a network - other
subjects, resources, or even network devices. Chat et al. [24] provides a good visual of
how ReBAC operates at Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: ReBAC representation of access control in a user network. [24]
At rst glance, it appears that RBAC and ReBAC are identical; where RBAC uses a
role as an intermediary, ReBAC appears to be using a relation. A closer look, however,
reveals that ReBAC relations associate subjects to objects - permissions are not directly
involved with relation types in a ReBAC model. The dierence between the two models
becomes more visible if we consider Figure 2.7.
A ReBAC model would evaluate a subject's access rights based on the subject's relations
to objects. The model employs policy languages that parametrize these binary user
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Figure 2.7: In ReBAC subjects and objects are logically connected to one another through
relations.
relations in order to produce access control decisions. Theoretically speaking, a subject
may request access to any object along its chain of relational connections, and therefore a
policy language needs to take into account every connection. In the following subsections
we will analyse the existing prominent ReBAC models and discuss how each one has
motivated our research.
2.12.1 Notation
In the following subsections, we will be using a common notation to describe current
research's approach to ReBAC. U represents the set of a Online Social Network (OSN)'s
users, and a I represents the set of an OSN's relations. R  U U represents the binary
relations R of type I between an OSN's users.
2.12.2 Fong's ReBAC
Fong et al. [39], [15], [40] introduces a ReBAC model, which includes bi-directional rela-
tionships, relational contexts, and a scalable policy language. Despite our research focus,
which is to dene a universal ReBAC policy language, we will analyse Fong's model and
explain his take on ReBAC. In Fong's model, I represents all possible relation types
between users. A relation type would be for example `parent' in a family social network,
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or `colleague' in a business social network. U represents the nite static set of users (or
vertices in a graph representation of a social network) in the system. As such, Fong
denes a social network G as hU; fRigi2Ii where fRigi2I is a family of binary relations
- the binary relation Ri  V  V species the pair of individuals participating in rela-
tionship type i. Fong's model allows for bi-directional relations. The inverse of a binary
relation Ri is relation R
 1
i . For example the relationship (patient-physician)'s inverse is
(physician-patient).
In order to partially replicate the concept of RBAC's role inheritance, Fong introduces
the concept of hierarchical contexts, which he uses to activate and deactivate user rela-
tions for each incoming access request. Each context is aliated with a particular set
of relations, which in turn is a subset to the global set of user relations. A function
sn : C ! hV; fRigi2Ii maps a particular context to a social network. Contexts are fur-
thermore connected to one another through hierarchies. Figure 2.8 displays an example
of contextual inheritance in a health care application domain.
Figure 2.8: A relational context hierarchy. National-EHR-Repository serves as the root
of the tree, and every child context inherits its parents social networks. [39]
The top of the tree represents the root context, which is called c0 in Fong's work. c0 is
a parent context to every other context in Fong's network, and every context inherits its
parents' social networks, while system administrators are free to add or remove contexts
from the contextual tree. Finally, Fong denes an access control policy as a ternary
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predicate of signature: U U G(U ; I)! f0; 1g - given two users and a social network,
the users are either related to one another through a relation of type I, or not. A policy
predicate P takes a subject, an object and social network as inputs and returns a boolean
access decision.
Consider a system N = hI;U ;R; C; c0; policy; owneri, where I is the set of relations, U is
the set of users, R is the set of binary relations between users, C is the set of all contexts,
c0 is the default root context, policy is the policy to be used for the access control decision,
and owner is the resource owner. Now consider a state  = hC; sn; extendsi, where C
represents the active network context, sn a mapping function that maps resources to
owners, and extends an inheritance function that returns the set of contexts a context
inherits from. A user u who wishes to access an object o in a context c, is authorised as
follows:
N = hI;U ;R; C; c0; policy; owneri  = h C,sn,extends i
c 2 C
P = policy(o) u = owner(r) G = esn(c)
P(u, v, G)
 ` N accesses o in c
So far, we have discussed Fong's network set up and the process of authorization. In order
to evaluate a subject's request for an object in a particular OSN, Fong has developed his
own policy language, B, which is dened by the following grammar:
;  ::= > j a j : j  _  j hii
where i 2 I. Fong denes a satisfaction relation G, u, v j= , which asserts that in a
social network G, owner u 2 V and accessor v 2 V are related in a manner specied by
formula . The full semantics of this satisfaction relation are as follows:
• G, u, v j= >
• G, u, v j= a i a = v
• G, u, v j= : i it is not the case that G, u, v j= 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• G, u, v j=  _  i G, u, v, act j=  or G, u, v j=  
• G, u, v j= hii i there exists u0 2 U such that (u; u0) 2 Ri and G; u0; v j= 
In particular, G, u, v j= hii allows resource owners to create security policies based
on their relations to other users by substituting  with a. So, for example, hspousei a
would mean that only a subject's spouse can access the subject's resource. B, though
quite versatile for simple relational expressions, proves inadequate in dealing with more
complicated scenarios. Fong has identied B's weaknesses in his own work [39]. By
trying to implement examples where disjoint vertices need to be evaluated, he realised
there was no way of dening a policy formula in B that performs as desired. Consider
the following examples, as dened by Fong:
`(COMMON FRIENDS) Consider again pseudo-Facebook social networks.
Dene the policy cfk such that cfk(G)(u; v)iff(a)u = v; or (b)v is a neigh-
bour of u, or (c) there are k (or more) common neighbours between u and v.
Intuitively, access is granted to a stranger if k friends of the owner witness
to the trustworthiness of this stranger. This policy is another generalization
of the friend-of-friend policy in Facebook. Specically, the number of com-
mon neighbours is taken as a measure of the strength of trust between two
strangers. Having the trust level exceeding the threshold k results in access
granting.'
`(CLIQUE) Consider yet again pseudo-Facebook social networks. Dene the
policy clique k such that clique k(G)(u; v)iff(a)u = v, or (b) u and v belong
to a clique of size k (or more) in acq(G). Intuitively, access is granted if the
accessor and the owner belong to a close-knit community of size k (or more).
This policy is a generalization of the friend policy in Facebook. Specically,
the size of the largest common clique to which two neighbouring individuals
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Figure 2.9: B is unable to tell the dierence between these two networks. [39]
belong is taken as a measure of the strength of trust between them. Having a
trust level exceeding the threshold k results in access granting.'
It is impossible to implement these two examples using B due to the fact that there
are no operators in B that accommodate the need for disjoint vertices/dissimilar users.
Consider the Clique example - a B policy to implement the example would be:
a _(:a^hfriendia^hfriendi(:a^hfriendia))
The rst thing we would like to note is the rising complexity when it comes to dening
a lengthy relational policy. Furthermore, there is no constraint in B to ensure that
evaluating such a policy would not resort in a circular network journey. Fong displays
this issue well in Figure 2.9.
To deal with this, Fong introduced two new symbols toB, 
 and @p:. 
 is used to ensure
that two values are disjoint, whereas @p: (Which can occur both bound and unbound)
represents a network user who is not a. Fong then renamed his policy language to E. In
E, given a social network G, a function  : P ! V (G) is called a binding environment:
• G, , u j= >
• G, , u j= p i (p) = u
• G, , u j= : i it is not the case that G, , u j= 
• G, , u j=  ^  i G, , u j=  or G, , u j=  
2.12. ReBAC 37
• G, , u j= hii i there exists u0 2 U such that (u0; u) 2 Ri and G;; u0 j= 
• G, , u j= hii i there exists u0 2 U such that (u; u0) 2 Ri and G;; u0 j= 
• G, , u j= @p: i p 6= a and G;[p! u]; u j= 
• G, , u j= 
 i the following holds: Let u be (a). There exists two subsets U1
and U2 of U(G), such that U(G) = U1[U2; U1\U2 = fu; vg, and both G[V1];; u j=
 and G[U2];; u j=  hold.
According to Fong, a formula 
 holds whenever the relationships described by  and
 both hold between the accessor and the owner, but the set of intermediary vertices used
for establishing these two relationships are disjoint. p on the other hand is used inside a
formula  to test whether its result is the owner. With these new symbols, Fong's clique
problem is solved by altering the original formula into the following form:
a _(:a^hfriendia^@p:hfriendi(:p ^ :a^hfriendia)).
The bound and unbound @ps in the above formula are used to make sure that the
condition @p:hfriendi(:p^:a^hfriendia) does not return 'a' as a result, thus allowing
to avoid the original circularity problem experienced with B and displayed in Figure 2.9.
2.12.3 Carminati's ReBAC
Carminati et al. [19], [23], [21], [16], [22], [19], [18] and [20] oers a dierent approach
to ReBAC than Fong. Her proposed notation, though unable to describe complex re-
lationships, captures a wider variety of OSN properties. Like D-FOAF [54], Carminati
takes into consideration the number of users involved in a relationship as well a trust
ratio involved in a relationship between users. For example, a friendship relationship be-
tween users, A and B, may hold a trust ratio of 0:8, while the same relationship this time
directed from user B to user A may be rated by user B as 0.5. Personalised relationship
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Figure 2.10: A Carminati ReBAC, inclusive of trust ratios. [19]
ratios and distance between users can be represented in Carminati's notation, and used
for a ne-grained access control.
Carminati denes a social network as a tuple (U ;R; I; T F) where I is the set of an OSN's
relation types, U is the set of all users, R is the set of all relations between users, and
T F is a function T F : Ri ! [0; 1] that assigns a trust ratio in every binary user relation
in the system. Carminati denes an access control policy as follows:
An access control policy p is a tuple (o, rules), where o is the identier
of an object, whereas rules is a set of rules rule1; :::; rulen, expressing the
requirements a user must satisfy in order to be allowed access to an object o.
Accordingly, an access control rule is dened as follows:
Given an OSN, an access control rule against the OSN is a tuple (u, r, Dmax,
tmin), where u 2 U [ fg is the user with which the requestor must have a
relationship, r 2 R[fg is a relation, whereas Dmax 2 N [ fg and tmin 2
TSN [ fg are, respectively, the maximum depth and the minimum trust
level that the relationship must have. If u =  and/or i = , u corresponds
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to any user in U and/or r corresponds to any relationship in R, whereas if
Dmax =  and/or tmin = , there is no constraint concerning the depth
and/or trust level, respectively.
In order for an access control rule to be satised, every condition in the access control
rule must be satised. This means that conditions in an access control rule are connected
conjunctively. Formally, for a resource owner b, a resource o, a relation r, a maximum
depth d, and a minimum trust ratio t, Carminati denes a relational policy as:
hasSubj(rel; b)^ hasObj(rel; o)^ hasType(rel; r)^ hasDepth(rel; d)^ hasTrust(rel; t).
Consider Figure 2.10. If user A wished to create an access control policy pol1 to guard
a resource o, so that only her immediate friends, or their friends, of trust ratio 0.7 or
higher could access that resource, she would dene the policy as follows:
pol1 = (o; (A;FRIEND; 2; 0:7))
For an access control policy to return a successful result, all access control conditions
inside its access control rule need to be satised. Applying pol1 on Figure 2.10, we see
that user B cannot access user A's resource o - despite being within the appropriate
distance, as well as being a FRIEND to A, A's trust ratio towards B is 0.6. User C,
however, is within the range of pol1, and has a higher trust ratio than 0.6. Therefore,
C can access A's resource, because his request satises the following Horn-like clauses:
hasSubj(?r; ?Alice) ^ hasObj(?r; o) ^ hasType(?r; FRIEND) ^ hasDepth(?r; ?D)^ 
(?D; 2) ^ hasTrust(?r; ?t)^  (?t; 0:7)) ! canAccess(?x; o). If an accessor satises
a policy by more than one paths, Carminati's model uses the shortest path available.
Consider user G in Figure 2.10. G satises pol1 through two dierent paths. Indirectly,
through user B, and also by being directly connected to user A. Evaluating the average
trust ratio from G to A through B, we get (0:6 + 1)=2 = 0:8. This trust ratio satises
pol1's minimum trust ratio, however the path A   B   G is not the shortest path by
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which user G is connected to user A. User A's direct connection to user G has a trust
ratio of 0.3 and, as such, user G is denied access to resource o.
Since Carminati employs localized access control (access control decisions are evaluated
by policy owners, and not by a central administrative authority), she needs a way for
each user to verify path discovery during the access control evaluation process. For
this purpose, she employs digital signatures and certicates in order to verify every
possible path between a policy owner and an accessor [18]. To ensure the validity of users
collaborating in a path discovery process, Carminati utilizes private/public keypairs,
which are assigned to each user. Each user sharing a direct edge with a keyholder, is
aware of the keyholder's public key and public/private keys are exchanged upon creation
of edges as a means of verication of a new connection. While discovering paths, every
user in the path collaborates in the discovery by signing the discovery process with his
public key. This way, Carminati minimizes the potential threat of a user gaining access
by using the most convenient connection path instead of the shortest one.
An access control policy may comprise more than one access control rules. Consider the
revised version of pol1:
pol1 = (o; (A;FRIEND; 2; 0:7); (A;FRIEND; 1; 0:2))
The access control rules in pol1, are formally written in Carminati's condition as:
(hasSubj(rel; b) ^ hasObj(rel; o) ^ hasType(rel; r) ^ hasDepth(rel; d) ^ hasTrust(rel; t)) _
(hasSubj(rel; b) ^ hasObj(rel; o) ^ hasType(rel; r) ^ hasDepth(rel; d) ^ hasTrust(rel; t))
If a user satises either disjunctive set of access control conditions, then the user is
granted access to a resource. To further increase her model's security, Carminati has
introduced distribution rules [17]. Essentially, distribution rules protect user relationships
by dening which users are aware of each particular relationship. In order for an access
control policy path to be considered as valid, the accessor needs to satisfy the distribution
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rules of every user along the path. Consider Figure 2.11. Every user has dened a
distribution rule that dictates which nodes are aware of the user's relationships. User D,
for example, has dened his distribution rule as (D;FRIEND; 1). This means that only
his direct friends can use D's relations as valid access control policy paths.
A
B
0.4FRIEND
FRIEND
C
DR(A, FRIEND, *)
DR(C, FRIEND, 2)
DR(B, FRIEND, 3)
D E
FRIEND FRIEND
0.2
0.4
1
DR(D, FRIEND, 1)
DR(E, FRIEND, 4)
F
1
DR(F, FRIEND, 4)
Figure 2.11: A Carminati ReBAC, inclusive of distribution rules. [19]
Consider pol2:
pol2 = (o; (A;FRIEND; ; 0:6)
With pol2 user A declares that every user directly or indirectly connected to him may ac-
cess resource o, provided they satisfy his trust ratio. His distribution rule isDR(A;FRIEND; ).
Let us now assume that users D, E, and F try to access A's resource. User D fails to
access resource o, because of the trust ratio user A has awarded him (0.2). In order for
user E to be able to access resource o, he needs to have a trust ratio of 0.6 or higher.
Combining A and D's ratio, with D and E's, we get: (0:2 + 1)=2 = 0:6. User E also
satises both user A and D's distribution rules. DR(A;FRIEND; ) allows every user
directly or indirectly connected to A to use A's relations. DR(D;FRIEND; 1) allows
any user directly connected to D to use D's relations. Since E is directly connected to
D, E can use D's relation with A. Finally, and despite satisfying the trust ratio through
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combination (0:2 + 1 + 1)=3 = 0:7, user F cannot access user A's resource. The reason
for this, is that user F does not satisfy D's distribution rule.
Carminati further mentions how policies can be used to control any part of the access
control lifecycle [19]. In particular, Carminati divides policies in three subcategories:
Access control policies, ltering policies, and Admin policies. Access control policies
are used to regulate access to network objects. Filtering policies are used to determine
whether or not a subject is allowed to initiate an access request to begin with (e.g. can be
used by parents to block their children from requesting access to inappropriate objects).
Finally, admin policies are used in an administrative-driven system. In such a system,
where administrators are responsible for creating access control policies, admin policies
determine which users are allowed to create access control policies.
Finally, Carminati et al. touch upon the subject of collaborative access control poli-
cies [18], where an access control policy is in reality a collection of policies assembled
by dierent users in a network. Carminati uses OSN as a study case, explaining how
an object published in such a network may belong to multiple users. Imagine a photo
of a group of users that is published in one of the users' web space. It is natural to
assume that everyone in the photo should have a say about who may view the photo
and who may not. With that in mind, Carminati denes a collaborative access control
policy as a tuple: (SubV iew;ObjV iew;Mode; Type), where SubV iew is the collection of
users involved in the creation of the collaborative policy, ObjV iew as the collection of
resources the policy is responsible for, Mode 2 fAll;One;Majorityg species the num-
ber of policies that need be satised in order for access to be allowed (All the policies,
just one, or the majority) and Type species the type of the Collaborative policy - access
control, or admin.
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2.13 Fong vs Carminati
To the best of our knowledge, Fong has provided with the most exible of ReBAC policy
languages. B, and E provide a solid mechanism of declaring ReBAC security policies,
which include complex relational denitions.
However, reecting back to Section 1.1 and to the requirements an access control language
needs to satisfy in order to be expressive and adaptable, we note Fong and Carminati
models' short comings as follows:
1. Lack of policy composition - Fong's and Carminati's models do not allow policy
composition. Carminati has tried to introduce a rudimentary technique for policy
composition, but her approach lacks industrial standards' exibility (e.g., XACML
provides far more exibility in combining policies together, or grouping policies
in policy sets which can then be combined with one another, as we discuss in
Section 2.15).
2. Lack of extensibility - Both Fong and Carminati needed to amend or redene
their original policy language models in order to cope with new access control
requirements. A policy language should, ideally, be able to cope with any new
requirements without having to radically change its core denitions.
3. Incomprehensible format - Fong and Carminati's models grow too verbose when
it comes to dening complex relationships. As such, extensive user training may
be required, and further retraining may be needed should either model decide to
change its original notations.
2.14 RBAC vs ReBAC
RBAC and ReBAC would perform equally well in a static network of users without any
delegation involved. Both RBAC and ReBAC support rights delegation, but there are
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dierences between the two models. In RBAC, a user can only delegate rights he already
possesses. Furthermore, in order for delegation to occur in RBAC, the delegator must
be aware of the delegatee's identity. In contrast, ReBAC delegation does not require a
user to have the rights they are delegating nor does it require a delegator to know the
identity of a delegatee. We summarise their dierences in Tables 2.2 and Tables 2.3, and
as follows:
1. No administrative support is needed in ReBAC to handle policy changes. Once a
policy changes, it automatically adapts to its network's current status.
2. In ReBAC users can delegate rights that they do not possess because of the nature
of relational policies.
2.15 XACML
XACML [82] has been created to accomodate the need for a policy language that is
expressive enough to capture the ever shifting industrial requirements of business com-
panies. Given how fast today's organisations need to grow, and how often companies
merge, the industry requires access control tools that are quick to set up and easy to
use. XACML uses a combination of XML and attribute based access control (discussed
in Section 2.10) to dene access control policies and rules by which policies are applied.
XACML, using a software XACML engine, uses XML documents to receive an access
request from a subject to an object. It then processes the request against the set of
policies and rules that apply to the object in question, and uses combination algorithms
to evaluate the nal result of the request which is then returned in XML format to the
requesting subject. In the following subsections we will provide illustrations of XACML
access requests and responses, and explain the reasoning behind XACML's combining
algorithms.
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Functionality RBAC ReBAC
Rapid Informa-
tion Sharing
Hard - in a RBAC sys-
tem a group of admin-
istrators needs to have
explicit knowledge of
the system's users and
grant access to users
and user groups explic-
itly.
Easy - users dene relational poli-
cies through which they allow other
users access. Policy regulation is
user based, not administrator based.
Dynamic Net-
work
Hard - new users need
to be taken into account
and assigned to roles or
groups by a group of ad-
ministrators.
Easy - ReBAC depends on the re-
lations between its users, therefore
each user is responsible for main-
taining their relations with their im-
mediate connections. Policies re-
main unaected by how the network
grows or shrinks.
Delegation Normal - RBAC sup-
ports delegation, but
each delegatee must be
known to the resource
owner. The resource
owner decides which
rights to delegate to
another user. The
delegator must possess
the rights they are
delegating.
Easy - a ReBAC policy allows users
to act as connectors between the
policy owner and a distant user. In
that sense, every user in a relational
chain is a delegator against their
knowledge, but that does not mean
they necessarily have the rights they
are delegating across the network.
Table 2.2: Dierences between RBAC and ReBAC
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Functionality RBAC ReBAC
Permit/Blocked
lists
Easy - RBAC mod-
els can easily maintain
groups of users that are
explicitly allowed or dis-
allowed access to re-
sources.
Hard - ReBAC uses rela-
tional policies between users.
As such, it struggles to isolate
particular users for access or
deny of access.
Authentication Easy - RBAC can
use any authentication
means (e.g. username
and password), and
can employ the use of
cryptography to ensure
the authenticity of
requests.
Easy - ReBAC can use any
authentication means (e.g.
username and password), and
can employ the use of cryptog-
raphy to ensure the authentic-
ity of requests.
Integration
with XACML
Easy - RBAC is based
on attribute/value pairs
just as XACML is, and
is easily integrated in
the XACML platform.
Easy - Though ReBAC poli-
cies are more complicated
than attribute/value pairs,
they can be integrated in the
XACML engine through use
of XACML PIP.
Table 2.3: Dierences between RBAC and ReBAC (continued)
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Figure 2.12: XACML Workow [82]
2.15.1 XACML Workow
Whenever an access request is made in a XACML-based system, the request is intercepted
by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) point as shown in Figure 2.12. At this stage,
the XACML engine retrieves the policies relevant to the current request from the Policy
Administration Point (PAP) and then proceeds to evaluate these policies for a nal deci-
sion at the Policy Decision Point (PDP). After every relevant policy has been evaluated,
and a nal decision has been reached through the use of combining algorithms (see sub-
section 2.15.3), the XACML engine either denies the request or provides the requesting
user with an authorized request token, allowing him to complete his request. The actual
XACML process is far more complex than this, but since our focus is on incorporating
XACML's request, policy evaluation and response processes to our work, we will not be
studying the rest of the engine's qualities in further detail.
2.15.2 Access Request
Recall from Section 2.2 that any access control model is based on a subject and an object
and control is regulated depending on the access rights of the subject. In XACML an
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access request contains information about the subject, the object and the action the sub-
ject wishes to perform on the object. This is represented in XML as a <AttributeValue
DataType> information. For example, in the listing below, a user named Evan Aktoudi-
anakis is requesting read access to his medical records, as seen at the following listing's
<attributevalue> elements :
<?xml ve r s i on ="1.0" encoding="UTF 8"?>
<Request xmlns="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 3 . 0 : core : schema :wd 17"
xmlns : x s i="http ://www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema i n s t ance "
x s i : schemaLocation="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 3 . 0 : core : schema :wd 17
http :// docs . oa s i s open . org /xacml /3 .0/ xacml core v3 schema wd 17. xsd"
ReturnPo l i cy IdL i s t=" f a l s e ">
<Att r ibute s Category="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 1 . 0 : subject category : access sub j e c t">
<Attr ibute Inc lude InResu l t=" f a l s e "
Att r ibute Id="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 1 . 0 : sub j e c t : subject id">
<Attr ibuteValue DataType="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 1 . 0 : data type : rfc822Name">
ea00128@surrey . ac . uk</Attr ibuteValue>
</Attr ibute>
</Attr ibutes>
<Att r ibute s
Category="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 3 . 0 : a t t r ibu t e category : r e sou r c e">
<Attr ibute Inc lude InResu l t=" f a l s e "
Att r ibute Id="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 1 . 0 : r e sou r c e : resource id">
<Attr ibuteValue DataType="http ://www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">
f i l e : // example/med/ record / pat i en t /EvanAktoudianakis</Attr ibuteValue>
</Attr ibute>
</Attr ibutes>
<Att r ibute s
Category="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 3 . 0 : a t t r ibu t e category : ac t i on">
<Attr ibute Inc lude InResu l t=" f a l s e "
Att r ibute Id="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 1 . 0 : ac t i on : act ion id">
<Attr ibuteValue DataType="http ://www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g">read</Attr ibuteValue>
</Attr ibute>
</Attr ibutes>
</Request>
2.15.3 Combining Algorithms
An access request as identied in Section 2.15.2 is intercepted by the Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) of the XACML engine. At this stage, rules and policies associated with
the request's object target are retrieved and evaluated. Each rule may return a `Permit'
value, or a `Deny' value depending on whether the rule was designed to allow or disallow
access. In the case where a rule does not apply to a particular subject, `Not Applicable'
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is returned. Finally XACML uses the 'Indeterminate' value to refer to erroneous results
(e.g., a network error, a badly congured rule object etc.) An object may have more
than one rules associated with it, and thus XACML needs a way to combine the access
control decision of each rule into a unary result. In order to achieve this, XACML uses
a notion called combining algorithms. There are four types of combining algorithms
in XACML [82], [53], [9]:
Permit Override - If any of the rules evaluated returns a `Permit', then the `Permit'
value overrides all the rest.
Deny Override - If any of the rules evaluated returns a `Deny', then the `Deny' value
overrides all the rest.
First Applicable - The rst rule that returns a valid result (Permit or Deny) is used.
The rest are discarded.
Only One Applicable - Permit and deny rules are combined to `Not Applicable' val-
ues. If more than one rule return a valid response, then this combining algorithm
will always return `Not Applicable'.
Like rules, combining algorithms can be combined hierarchically (e.g., a combining al-
gorithm may apply to a ruleset A, another one to a ruleset B, with a nal combining
algorithm being applied to the results of the two former sets.) Combining algorithms are
an integral part of XACML, allowing ner granularity in creating access control policies.
2.15.4 Request Response
<?xml ve r s i on ="1.0" encoding="UTF 8"?>
<Response xmlns="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 3 . 0 : core : schema :wd 17"
xmlns : x s i="http ://www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema i n s tance "
x s i : schemaLocation="urn : o a s i s : names : tc : xacml : 3 . 0 : core : schema :wd 17
http :// docs . oa s i s open . org /xacml /3 .0/ xacml core v3 schema wd 17. xsd">
<Result>
<Decis ion>Permit</Decis ion>
</Result>
</Response>
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Similarly to a request, a response arrives formatted in XML that abides to the XACML
standard. The response is a much shorter document, which can optionally contain all
the attributes relevant to the original request (e.g., the requesting user's ID, the target
object's id, etc. ) as well as the nal evaluation result. In the above listing's case, the end
result is `Permit', thus allowing the requesting user read access to his medical records.
2.15.5 XACML alternatives
There are a few alternatives to XACML. The most notable ones are EPAL [9] and Pon-
der [32]. Both languages are similar to XACML in functionality, with EPAL deriving
from XACML standards to further dene additional functionality (e.g., obligation poli-
cies, which trigger under certain conditions;something that has been included in XACML
3.0), and Ponder goes as far as dening its own non-XML policy language. We have cho-
sen XACML as the access control platform for our implementation purposes, due to the
fact that it is currently the most popular platform within industry. Additionally, unlike
its competitors, XACML has been dened by several formal models, and is thus easier
to integrate with our work. We will be integrating XACML with our work in Chapter 5.
2.16 Summary
In this chapter we have discussed various access control mechanism and we have presented
the dierences between RBAC and ReBAC. To further exemplify the dierences we
present a scenario to illustrate the dierences and highlight the benet that a ReBAC
model provides in being able to allow its policies to be applicable in the context of a
changing system. The next chapter motivates the use of a ReBAC model in the context
of a system which is not an Online Social Network but that uses relationships as part
of its access control mechanism. We will refer again to the short comings of the Fong
and Carminati models in Chapter ?? when we demonstrate that our approach provides
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solutions to these short comings.
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Chapter 3
Scenario
3.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a real life crisis scenario so that it can be used as a running
example in the subsequent chapters to illustrate our new relationship based access control
model STReBAC, the combination of STReBAC with an ABAC model and then how the
hybrid model can be implemented as a proof of concept. The chapter aims to convince
the reader that using a RBAC as the access control mechanism for such a scenario is bad
because the scenario involves a dynamically changing network which is cumbersome to
regulate using a role based access control mechanism. The chapter aims to clarify through
an example the research gap that we are going to ll by proposing a new relationship
based access control model. The chapter compares how the scenario is modelled in
both RBAC and ReBAC. Through the use of ReBAC we demonstrate how it can be used
to describe multiple access control policies and how their evaluation can be combined,
and furthermore that the policies can still be applied even after the network changes its
state, and the relationships within the networks have changed. Hence, we illustrate that
access control policies need not be modied in order for them to cope with any network
changes when the access control mechanism is dened in terms of relationships.
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3.2 Scenario
We base our scenario on the tragic disappearance of the Malaysia Airlines ight MH370 [4].
The nature of the accident, as well as the fact that the plane had travelled for hundreds
of miles since its last known location, has mobilised many countries, all of which are
now involved in the investigation (at the time of writing, these countries were: Malaysia,
China, Vietnam, United States, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia,
and the Philippines), with Malaysia being the country having initiated the search.
The Malaysian authorities nd themselves in need of quickly setting up a dynamic net-
work that would eventually comprise the countries and organisations working together
to help resolve the crisis. Information needs to be shared as soon as it becomes available,
but it also needs to be regulated so that sensitive information is not disclosed to unau-
thorised users. The network should also allow delegation between users. Recall that we
introduced the notion of delegation in Section 2.3. Users should be allowed to delegate
access rights based on their roles in the network (e.g., a team leader could delegate access
rights to his secretary).
We propose the building of such a network as follows. At rst, the Malaysian network
should extend an invitation to the leaders of the countries and organisations participating
in the search for the lost aircraft. Assuming that each country and organisation belong to
networks of their own, their leaders would eectively belong in both their home network
and the Malaysian network.
As time passes, the leader of each country participating in the search may invite new
members from her original network into the Malaysian one. The policies set in place
by the Malaysian authorities need to accommodate the changes in the network, and to
regulate the control of information for users from dierent countries. Teams and organi-
sations use their own communication standards in their own networks, so the Malaysian
authorities would need to employ the services of an industry standard communication
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Figure 3.1: Workow of a resource request.
platform. For our scenario, we have chosen XACML but any platform exposing standard
APIs would work just as well.
Finally, we assume that Malaysian authorities encrypt their resources to gain an extra
level of security. In order for a user to acquire a decrypted version of a resource, she needs
to satisfy the access control policy set in place by the resource's owner. Typically, the
access control module has no responsibility for decryption or choice of encryption/decryp-
tion algorithms. A request for decryption is made to a third-party application, which in
turn contacts the XACML engine set in place in order to validate the request. If valida-
tion of the request is successful, the resource is decrypted and returned to the requesting
user. To keep our example simple, we focus on the Malaysian and Chinese networks
and users. The conclusions we draw from our example can be safely applied to any other
country or organisation applying to join the Malaysian network. Figure 3.1 demonstrates
the steps a Malaysian network user (e.g., the Chinese team leader) requests access to a
Malaysian network le owned by the Malaysian Oce.
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1. The Chinese team leader requests a le originally created by a Malaysian team
leader.
2. The Chinese team leader acquires an encrypted version of the le.
3. The Chinese team leader sends the le to a third-party application, along with a
decryption request.
4. The application forwards the le and the request to the XACML engine responsible
for handling access control.
5. The XACML engine contacts the module responsible for access control, and eval-
uates the request.
6. The evaluation result is returned to the third-party app. If successful, it returns a
decrypted version of the le to the Chinese team leader.
The above steps and their order of execution are quite common within industry. The
actual access control model choice however (e.g., RBAC vs. ReBAC) should vary de-
pending on the scenario at hand. Some models, like RBAC, are strong when it comes to
explicitly controlling user access to resources, or maintaining blocked user groups. Re-
BAC on the other hand better suits a case where a network expands dynamically, and
users do not require direct knowledge of who accesses their resources. In order to compare
both RBAC and ReBAC we implement three policies of varying complexity that capture
an appropriate set of access control requirements for the scenario. The Malaysian team
leader creates the following policies:
P-1 Anyone aliated to the Malaysian team leader, or anyone aliated to his direct
aliations can access his le(s).
P-2 Anyone directly aliated to the Malaysian team leader are not allowed to access
his le(s), but their aliates are.
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P-3 Anyone who shares a connection path with the Malaysian team leader can access
his le(s).
If the teams were simply part of single network this could be handled easily. Given
that the ability for the Chinese team leader to access les from the Malyaisan network
is set up once the Malaysian network dynamically includes the Chinese team leader we
demonstrate in the next sections how RBAC and ReBAC handle the situation and explain
the obstacles faced by the two access control models.
3.3 RBAC
Figure 3.2 shows the initial state of the Malaysian and Chinese networks from a RBAC
model's point of view. Both the Malaysian authorities network and the Chinese author-
ities network are self-contained networks. Each network has its own users and roles, of
which we display only a small portion. We assume both the Malaysian network and
the Chinese network each contain a single user group. To begin with, everyone in the
Malaysian user group is allowed access to the Malaysian leader's resource(s) and the
Malaysian leader's secretary is acting administrator for the Malaysian network. The
Malaysian leader decides to use P-1 of Section 3.2 as his initial access control policy.
Figure 3.2: Initial network state of the Malaysian and Chinese networks.
In order for the Chinese leader gain to access to the Malaysian leader's resource(s), the
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Figure 3.3: Chinese team leader joins the Malaysian network.
Chinese leader needs to join the Malaysian network. The following process needs to take
place:
1. The Chinese leader requests to join the system.
2. The Malaysian leader's secretary allows the Chinese leader to join the system
3. The Malaysian leader's secretary assigns Chinese leader to a role that allows access
to the Malaysian leader's resources.
In our example, the Malaysian leader's secretary is responsible for allowing new users into
the network, as well as for assigning new users to roles. Once she allows the Chinese leader
in the network, he is allowed access to the Malaysian leader's resource(s) by satisfying the
rst policy of Section 3.2. The new state of the Malaysian network is shown at Figure 3.3.
We note how the Chinese leader belongs in both the Malaysian and the Chinese network,
and has dierent privileges in each network.
Now, let us assume that the second Chinese member, referred to as Chinese member
two, in Figure 3.3 also wishes to access the Malaysian leader's resource. Though she is
unaware of the Malaysian leader and his secretary, she requires access to any information
gathered by the Malaysian authorities so far. She is, however, aware that the Chinese
leader has joined the Malaysian network. Hence, Chinese member two contacts the
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Figure 3.4: Chinese member two joins the Malaysian network.
Malaysian secretary in order to join the Malaysian network. The following steps take
place:
1. Chinese member two requests to join the system.
2. The Malaysian leader's secretary conrms Chinese member two's identity with the
Chinese leader.
3. The Malaysian leader's secretary allows Chinese member two to join the system.
4. The Malaysian leader's secretary assigns Chinese member two to a role that allows
access to the Malaysian leader's resources.
Figure 3.4 shows the new state of our network. This process, though simple, demonstrates
RBAC's rst issue in dealing with a fast-expanding network. RBAC depends on a group
of administrators, in this case the Malaysian leader's secretary, in order to allow users to
join the network as well as to assign roles to new users. The Malaysian leader's secretary
consults with the Chinese leader concerning Chinese member two's join application, and
then grants her access. This works well in our example where we only consider four
members in a role, but in a network comprising thousands of users with thousands of
join requests, one can imagine that the administrators would struggle to both validate and
authorise those requests. One solution would be to remove the need for administrators
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to authorise new user applications, but we would still need a way to assign new users to
a role.
The Malaysian leader decides to amend his policy to P-2 of Section 3.2. His intention
is to prevent his secretary from reading sensitive information, information he would like
to make available to other countries' team leaders, but he is faced with two problems.
The rst problem is that there is no way to easily track aliations in a RBAC model.
A solution would be to create dierent roles to monitor and describe aliations between
users, but these roles would need to be kept up to date by administrators. This would
make the process prone to human error, and unmanageable if the network grows into
a very large size. Figure 3.5 demonstrates this problem where the Malaysian secretary
and the Chinese member two were both part of the Malaysian network but belong to the
network is not enough to regulate access.
The second problem is that the Malaysian secretary is responsible for admitting every
new user into the network (e.g., both foreign country leaders and members), and assigning
them to roles. In order to assign the right users to the right roles, she would need to
contact someone aliated to each new user (e.g., in our case, the Chinese leader), and
then assign the new user to the appropriate role. This task may appear trivial in our
example, but it would quickly become unmanageable and human error prone as a network
grows in size.
Things get more challenging when the Malaysian leader amends his policy to P-3 of
Section 3.2. Now anyone aliated to the Malaysian leader, directly or indirectly, should
be allowed to access the Malaysian leader's le(s). But what happens if the Chinese leader
removes Chinese member two from the Chinese network? The Chinese leader would then
need to contact the Malaysian secretary and alert her that he can no longer vouch for
Chinese member two. Then the Malaysian secretary would need to remove Chinese
member two from her current Malaysian role. In a reversal of the problem, imagine
the state of the network after a hundred Chinese members have joined the Malaysian
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Figure 3.5: Chinese team leader leaves the Malaysian network. Chinese member two
remains, but though in a role with the Malaysian members, she is not really aliated to
either the Malaysian leader, or his secretary.
network, each one veried by the Chinese leader. What would happen if the Chinese
leader was to be removed from the Chinese network? The Malaysian secretary would
then be faced with two challenges. First, she would need be notied that the Chinese
leader no longer holds a position of authority in his own network. Secondly, she would
need to manually remove each and every Chinese member from their respective roles in
the Malaysian network. We can see once more how the process becomes too complex and
unmanageable the larger a network grows.
This small scale representation of our networks demonstrated the fundamental issues a
RBAC model would encounter when dealing with a fast-growing, relational network. In
the next section we will see how ReBAC manages to handle some of these problems.
3.4 ReBAC
As discussed in Section 2.12, ReBAC employs policies that use the relations between
network users to regulate access control on user resources. Picking up from the example
in Section 3.3, Figure 3.6 demonstrates the initial network set up for the Malaysian and
Chinese networks.
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Figure 3.6: The two networks before the Chinese team leader requests to join the
Malaysian network.
The Malaysian leader creates a policy which states that his connections, or the connec-
tions of his connections can access his resources in accordance to P-1 of Section 3.2. Just
as with RBAC, in order for the Chinese leader to gain access to the Malaysian leader's
resources, the Chinese leader needs to join the Malaysian network. The following process
needs to take place:
1. The Chinese leader requests to join the system.
2. The Malaysian leader's secretary allows the Chinese leader to join the system
3. The Malaysian leader's secretary and the Chinese leader establish a relational con-
nection between them.
On rst glance, the process is similar to that of RBAC. The Malaysian secretary still
needs to authorize the Chinese team leader's join request. However, instead of assigning
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the Chinese team leader to a role, she establishes a Malaysian network relation with him.
In doing so, and being related to the Malaysian leader, the Chinese leader satises P-1
of Section 3.2. Figure 3.7 shows the updated Malaysian network.
Figure 3.7: Chinese leader joins the Malaysian network.
There is a Malaysian network connection path between the Malaysian team leader and
the Chinese leader. This means that both the Malaysian secretary and the Chinese
leader are able to access the Malaysian leader's resources. Now let us assume that the
Malaysian leader amends his policy to P-2 of Section 3.2. His intention is to prohibit
his secretary from reading his resource, while allowing those she is directly connected to
(in our example, the Chinese leader) to do so. We immediately note ReBAC's advantage
over RBAC: there is no need to administrate users or roles, because ReBAC policies work
directly on user relations. Furthermore, we note how the Malaysian secretary acts like the
connecting link between the Malaysian leader and the Chinese leader, thus allowing the
Chinese leader to access the Malaysian leader's resource, despite the Malaysian secretary
being unable to do so - delegation in ReBAC does not require the delegator to possess the
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rights they are delegating to a delegatee. So what happens if the network itself changes?
We can see this when another user, Chinese member one, joins the Malaysian network.
When Chinese member one joins the Malaysian network, she creates a Malaysian rela-
tion with the Chinese leader, without needing to notify either the Malaysian leader or
the Malaysian secretary of the fact. Once more we observe that there is no need for
administrative intervention. The Chinese leader knows Chinese member one, and vice
versa, and the Malaysian secretary need not be aware of the trusted relation between
the two. Based on the current policy, Chinese member one cannot access the Malaysian
leader's resource - he is not directly connected to one of the Malaysian leader's direct
connections. Figure 3.8 shows the updated network. Implementing Section 3.2's P-3 is
Figure 3.8: Chinese member 1 join the Malaysian network.
once more a simple matter: the Malaysian leader amends his policy allow anyone on a
connection path with him to access their resource. Since ReBAC policies automatically
take into account network changes, all Malaysian network members gain access to the
Malaysian leader's resource, since they are all connected to one another, as shown in Fig-
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ure 3.8. This is shown clearly, if the Malaysian secretary decides to severe her connection
with the Chinese leader. By doing so, she eectively breaks the network path, deriving
both the Chinese leader and Chinese member one from accessing the Malaysian leader's
resource. Now let us assume that Chinese member two joins the Malaysian network and
establishes a Malaysian relation with the Malaysian secretary, as shown in Figure 3.9.
Based on the Malaysian leader's current policy, his secretary and Chinese member two
Figure 3.9: Chinese member 1 join the Malaysian network.
are allowed access to his resource. The Chinese leader and Chinese member one, are not
allowed access to the Malaysian leader's resource.
3.4.1 Using combining algorithms for further renement
Recall how we discussed combining algorithms in Section 2.15.3. In Section 3.2 we intro-
duced three policies: P-1 (up to two step connections are allowed to access a resource),
P-2 (direction connections are not allowed to access les, but their connections are per-
mitted access to those les) and P-3 (anyone connected on a path to the policy owner,
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has access). Note that P-2 would not necessarily use a combining algorithm since it
could be dened using logical combinators. If the policy owner wanted to make sure that
anyone connected to him except for direct connections can access his resource, he would
use a combined algorithm to combine policies as follows: Deny-Override(P2, P3).
With both policies being evaluated for a direct connection, P-2 and P-3 would return
Deny and Permit but because of combining algorithms the result of Deny would be the
yielding result. Only if, when the entire policy chain was evaluated, the results were
a combination of Permit and Not Available (for connections which did not satisfy the
policy), would a permit be returned. In our example the policy owner may want to use
policies P-2 and P-3 to grant connection to everyone but his secretary.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have illustrated a scenario in terms of two access control models to
exemplify the dierence between the two access control mechanisms. We presented the
scenario through the consideration of the changing policies in order to describe how
dierent policies could be applicable.
The scenario did not dierentiate between the dierent kinds of access should be per-
mitted, for example read or write. Therefore in addition to dealing with relationships in
ReBAC we need to think carefully about what kind of access is permitted, be that read
and/or write. Therefore, the ability to model relationship based access control is the
contribution of the next chapter where we present our formal denitions for STReBAC,
and provide examples of how it could be used to provide access control for the scenario
we have presented in this chapter. Then we move on to Chapter 5 where we combine
relationship based access control and attribute access control so that we can make best
use of an access control mechanism to be able to use combining algorithms and take into
account the kind of access that should be permitted, and that is adaptable to chang-
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ing networks whilst importantly retaining the ability of being able to express detailed
policies.
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Chapter 4
Relational Templates
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we propose a new ReBAC model whose aim is to provide an access control
model based on relationships that is very expressive. In Section 2.12 we reviewed the
models proposed by Fong [39], [40] and Carminati [19], [20], who based their approaches
on OSNs. We discussed how their notations changed as they expanded their notations
to deal with concepts analogous to Facebook expanding its `Friends' system to support
categories of friendship (e.g., close friends) and allowing users to create groups of their
own. Similarly, Google+ introduced social circles that would allow users to organize their
acquaintances according to their direct connection type (e.g., work, school and family).
The proposed models in the literature adjusted their policies in order to address dierent
problems but in this chapter we focus on providing a notation that would be able to
resolve both Fong's and Carminati's research goals, as well as one that is exible without
the constant need of introducing new notation to deal with new challenges.
We believe that our work provides an adaptable notation to rearm that the notions
captured by Fong et al., and Carminati et al. can be expressed simply. This simplicity
will be particularly evident when we examine policies associated to abstract paths. The
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added benet is that our model builds on Carminati et al.'s work, by allowing users to
be involved in more than one type of relationship.
Furthermore, we will introduce policy templates that provide a more general framework
for describing policies. By policies, we refer to the concept of a policy as described
in Section 2.2. Policy templates are a way to parameterise policies so that they can
be formally represented and validated using set theoretic notation, and are split in two
parts: policy parameters, which always includes the relationship constraints, and policy
evaluation. These templates enable users to create well formed policies and to focus on
the relationship constraints of the policies rather than their structure.
This chapter presents our work on a exible policy language notation, which has been
published on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST) [7], as follows: Section 4.2 provides the
set theory notation used in this chapter. Section 4.3 denes the policy templates for the
STReBAC approach. Section 4.4 illustrates an example to demonstrate the use of our
policy templates. Section 4.5 illustrates the policies of our example using the notation of
existing approaches and nally, Section 4.6 discusses the strengths and weaknesses of our
notation, motivating the work for the subsequent chapter. In particular, we will expand
our model to deal with permissions related to the kind of access permitted of a resource.
4.2 Set theory and notation
In this section we present the set theory notation that underpins our STReBAC approach.
In order to discuss our notation in line with the scenario presented in Chapter 3, let us
assume two dierent networks UM for Malaysia, and UC for China. Let us assume that
network UM comprises users fa; b; c; dg and network UC comprises users fe; f; gg. We
will be oering set theory denitions based on generic sets, and then will be providing an
example of how such a notation can be applied to our scenario. We begin by presenting
the denition of a Cartesian product.
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A Cartesian product of two generic sets S and T
is dened as: S  T = f(s; t) j s 2 S ^ t 2 Tg
In the case of our scenario's networks, UM and UC , their Cartesian product is dened as:
f(a; e); (b; e); (c; e); (d; e); (a; f); (b; f); (c; f); (d; f); (a; g); (b; g); (c; g); (d; g)g.
A binary relation R, between any two members s and t of two generic sets S and T is
dened as:
R  S  T
Hence, for example, we could dene a binary relation R between users of sets S and T ,
to be R  S  T and hence the relationship between user a of network S and user e of
network T would be the pair (a; e) 2 R
(a; e)
The identity relation , which is the relation of a set member to itself, on S is dened
to be:
(S) = f(s; t) j s 2 S; t 2 S; s = tg
In our example, (a; a) would represent user a's identity relation to himself. Relational
composition will play an important part in our work, because it allows us to combine
dierent binary relations together, and thus allows the creation of new, more complex
relations.
A binary relation between three set members s; u; t of three generic sets S; T; U as:
R1  S  T and R2  T  U then R1 ;R2 is the composed relation between S and U :
R1 ;R2 = f(s; u) j s 2 S ^ u 2 U ^ 9t.(t 2 T ^ (s; t) 2 R1 ^ (t; u) 2 R2)g.
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Hence for example if (a; b) 2 S and (b; c) 2 S then (a; c) 2 S;S.
Functional composition is dened as usual:
(f ; g)(x)
def
= (g  f)(x)def= g(f(x)).
This denition ensures that in a relational composition of type f ; g
we evaluate f , and then we evaluate g in respect to f .
We use the concept of reexive transitive closure to check whether there exists a binary
relation composition path between two users.
For n  1, we dene Rn+1 to be Rn ;R.
We dene R to be the reexive transitive closure of R, given by R =  [S1i=1Ri
To provide with an example, consider the relations (a; b); (b; c); (c; d) within network UM .
The reexive transitive closure of these three relations would be (a; b); (b; c); (c; d) =
(a; d), which would then signify there exists a connection path between a and d.
Based on the denitions so far, we would like to dene a grammar for the relational
expression R. This grammar will allow us to express complex relational combinations,
which will serve as the underpinning for the next section's policy templates:
R = B j R ;R j R j R1 [R2 j R1 \R2
where B is a basic binary relation (dened over U). An example of such a basic binary
relation, would be the binary relation (a; b) between users a and b in the UM network.
Finally, given a set of basic binary relations fB1; : : : ; Bng, we write  to denote the binary
relation B1 [    [Bn [.
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4.3 Policy Templates
As we discussed in Section 2.2, access control policies exist to identify which interactions
between users and data objects are authorized and which are not. Similarly to Fong
and Carminati's work, we refer to an attempted interaction as a request and assume
that a request is modelled as a pair (x; y), where x and y are users. (In other words,
y is either authorized to access all data objects belonging to x or authorized for none.
Note that this pair of users it not necessary a member of an existing relation.) Hence,
determining whether a request to access a resource is authorised or not is based on the
relationship(s) between the owner of the resource x and the requester, henceforth called
the accessor. Each policy is associated with an owner, which may be a user or the system.
Our STReBAC model assumes a nite set U represents all users in our social network.
In this section we will present our templates and briey discuss how each one can be used
to recreate solutions to existing works' ReBAC problems. A template can be generally
dened as follows:
policy, where request (x; y) is authorised
when Pred(x; y)
where policy is the syntatic name for the template, x is the owner of the policy template,
y is the accessor of the policy template and Pred(x; y) is a policy predicate, which
is parameterised by users and must be true in order for the request to be authorised.
Depending on the type of predicate, we can categorise our policy templates in three
categories: Relational, Abstract Path and Neighbourhood.
4.3.1 Relational template
This simple yet exible template allows us to formulate policies of varying relational
complexity. The template for this policy type is simply a relational expression:
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R, where request (x; y) is authorised if (x; y) 2 R
The predicate (x; y) 2 R simply means that accessor y is related to x by R. Therefore, a
relation policy template is simply a relation expression from the grammar. In practice,
R can be a complex relation, such as F ; F ; (F \ A), representing a chain of three
relations, where F is the friend relation and A is the associate relation. The relational
template is not concerned with dening explicit constraints within the policy on particular
connections paths or the lengths of the paths through a network that can be traversed.
A particularly common use of this template is for owners to dene policies regulating
access to their respective data objects. We use the shorthand u:R to denote a policy
specied by user u 2 U ; request (x, y) is authorised if x = u and (x; y) 2 R.
4.3.2 Abstract Path template
The Abstract Path template takes into consideration relational compositions, hop lengths
and connection paths. The template allows an owner to dene a policy based on relational
compositions to be satised by remote user pairs, provided that these user pairs lie
within a particular range of inuence. In more detail, it allows an abstract exploration of
connected users to nd those close enough to be of interest. Then those of interest will
need to be in a particular relationship with another user. That way, the owner's policy
takes into consideration remote user-pairs relational compositions rather than relational
compositions between the policy owner and the accessor.
This template is novel because it allows the creation of policies that have not been
proposed by previous related work.
An abstract path template has two forms:
(ran;R; n), where request (x; y) is authorised if
(z; y) 2 R and (x; z) 2 n for some z 2 U
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x
z
yR
n
(a) (ran;R; 2)
x
y
zR
n
(b) (dom;R; 2)
Figure 4.1: Illustration of R in Abstract Path templates
(dom;R; n), where request (x; y) is authorised if
(x; y) 2 n and there exists z 2 U such that (y; z) 2 R
The two forms arise because the predicate R representing the relational composition needs
to be considered from those users within a particular range of inuence and depends
on the direction of the relationships in the SN. This is particularly evident when the
relationships are themselves functions. The rst form denes that the relation of interest
R emanates from the accessor. The second form denes the accessor as the target of the
relation R. These dierences are shown in Figure 4.1. These denitions are illustrated
in Section 4.4. It is true that the rst form could be viewed as a simple relational policy
template, namely n;R. However, this abstract form means that we do not have to be
explicit about n when a user instantiates a policy template. Thus, when instantiating
a (ran;R; n) policy template, the basic relationships will be discovered during policy
evaluation of a particular network.
4.3.3 Neighbourhood templates
At this point, we will provide templates for two policy types introduced by Fong, and
discussed in Section 2.12 - the k common connectors and the k clique. In his work,
Fong displayed the need to amend his notation so as to include these two complex policy
examples. It is worth noting that none of the other existing work can replicate these
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policy formats introduced by Fong. We will use Fong's terminology for policies for our
templates as well.
k common connectors
Fong denes a problem where an accessor must share a number k dierent common friends
with the policy owner so that the accessor may be allowed access. Using disjunction and
conjunction connectors, Fong tried to solve the problem by dening the following policy:
(hR1ihR2ia^hR1ihR2ia) however, there is nothing restricting hR1ihR2ia^hR1ihR2ia from
referring to the same intermediate common friends twice. As such, Fong introduced 

as new notation to replace ^ for this particular example, asserting that 
 certies that
the intermediate friend nodes are dierent. We have used set theory notation to achieve
the same result without needing to introduce new symbols to our notation:
A neighborhood template has the following form:
(R1; R2; k), where request (x; y) is authorised if
there are exactly k users z such that
(x; z) 2 R1 and (z; y) 2 R2
For an accessor y and an owner x access is granted if x is related to y by R1 ; R2,
via a certain number, k, of common connections. The connections may be reached via
dierent relationship compositions, which is why we have R1 and R2 in the template.
This template could easily be extended to allow at least k users or at most k users by
the inclusion of a binary predicate in the policy denition, for example (R1; R2; k;) and
(R1; R2; k;).
k clique
Fong denes a problem where an accessor must be part of a closed connection circle of
at least k members one of which is the policy owner. As with the common connectors
4.4. Applying Relational Templates to an example 77
problem, Fong tried to solve the problem using disjunction and conjunction connectors
but found it impossible to ensure that each of the k users was dierent to all the others.
He introduced a new symbol @ to amend his denitions and managed to solve the problem
at the expense of making his language more complex. We dene a clique1 of k members
without needing to introduce new symbols and associated semantics to our notation:
(clique; k), where request (x; y) is authorised if
there is a set of k distinct elements fa0; : : : ; ak 1g
such that (ai; ai+1) 2  for 0  i < k   1,
and (ak 1; a0) 2 , and x; y 2 fa0; : : : ; ak 1g.
We could equally dene a policy based on cliques of at least k elements as follows:
(clique; k;), where request (x; y) is authorised if
there is a set of m  k distinct elements fa0; : : : ; am 1g
such that (ai; ai+1) 2  for 0  i < m  1,
and (am 1; a0) 2 , and x; y 2 fa0; : : : ; am 1g.
4.4 Applying Relational Templates to an example
Recall how in Chapter 3 we discussed a scenario where dierent countries and organisa-
tions needed to work together. In that chapter we focused on two dierent networks -
the Chinese network, and the Malaysian network. We discussed the challenges we would
face if we were to implement our solution using RBAC, and explained our decision to
attempt a ReBAC solution instead. In this section, we will use the policy templates
dened in Section 4.3 to justify our decision, as well as provide a formal implementation
of Chapter 3's scenario. Consider the following binary relations, where a set of users in
a network is typically inferred to by U, in order to be clear about which network to be
more explicit we say that UC is a set of users from a particular network C.:
1Note that this is not the standard graph-theoretic notion of clique; it is more accurately called a
cycle.
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• CN = UC UC , which models a Chinese network relation shared by every member
of the Chinese network.
• MN  UM  UM , which models a generic Malaysian network relation shared by
every member of the Malaysian network at the start of our example. When a new
user joins the Malaysian network, however, he will do so by a connection to a single
Malaysian network member.
• MT MN , which models a Malaysian network team relation shared by Malaysian
individuals grouped together in various teams.
• ML MN , which models a Malaysian leader relation, which connects the leaders
of the countries which are participating in the search, inside the Malaysian network.
• SO MN , which models a Malaysian Secretary-Of relation shared between some
Malaysian network members, and the Malaysian network's leader.
The example will illustrate how STReBAC deals with:
• Anonymous delegation - a form of delegation that automatically adapts to network
changes, and uses network members as delegators against their knowledge.
• Dynamic policy adaptation - dening policies that automatically adapt to network
changes.
In order to demonstrate the above, we will consider dierent a number of dierent sce-
narios.
We will start by illustrating a typical use for the Relational template, which we introduced
in Section 4.3. Let us assume that every member of the joint countries and organisations
participating in a rescue mission should have access to a communal calendar hosted in the
Malaysian network. The calendar's purpose is to alert subscribed members to updates
on the rescue mission's progress. Since Malaysia is the country coordinating the search,
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the Malaysian leader's (depicted as ml in Figure 4.2) lead secretary (depicted as ms in
Figure 4.2) is responsible for regulating access to this communal calendar. Prior to the
Chinese leader's (depicted as cl in 4.2) application to join the Malaysian network, the
latter solely comprises Malaysian members.
ml
ms
mnm
cl
cs
cnm
Malaysian Network Relation (MN) Chinese Network Relation (CN)
ml = Malaysian leader cl = Chinese leader
ms = Malaysian secretary cs = Chinese secretary
mnm = Malaysian network member cnm = Chinese network member
Figure 4.2: Visual representation of user binary relations. The rectangles separate coun-
try networks. The lines represent binary relations: dotted line(CN), and solid line(MN).
Let us assume that, at rst, only Malaysian network members are allowed access to
the communal calendar. ms uses the Relational policy template to regulate access to
the communal calendar. Even though all Malaysian network members are originally
connected to one another, a new member may join through a single connection to an
existing Malaysian network member. Should that happen, ms wants to ensure that
this new member, though not directly connected to her, would still have access to the
communal calendar. ms creates the following policy:
ms:MN (4.1)
The above policy is satised by anyone who is connected by a chain of MN relationships
to ms, regardless of the number of hops between ms and the aspiring accessor. Now, if
any Malaysian network member attempts to access the calendar, the policy is evaluated
by replacing y with that particular network member (as discussed in Section 4.3.1). Since
all Malaysian network members are connected between them by the MN relationship,
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they would have authorised access to the communal calendar.
Let us now consider the case where cl requests access to join the Malaysian network.
cl communicates with ml, and establishes a direct MN relation with him. Figure 4.3
demonstrates the new state of the two networks.
ml
ms
mnm
cl
cs
cnm
Malaysian Network Relation (MN) Chinese Network Relation (CN)
ml = Malaysian leader cl = Chinese leader
ms = Malaysian secretary cs = Chinese secretary
mnm = Malaysian network member cnm = Chinese network member
cl
Figure 4.3: The Chinese leader cl is now connected to the Malaysian leaderml as depicted
by the solid line(MN). The cl is now part of both networks.
We would like to point out how this simple, non-verbose policy, encapsulates both anony-
mous delegation and dynamic policy adaptation. Regarding delegation, notice how ms is
not directly connected to cl. ml acts like a connecting link between ms and cl, and it is
because of ml that cl is able to satisfy ms's policy. Were ml to terminate his connection
to cl, cl would then be unable to satisfy ms's policy. ms is unaware of all this, yet her
policy automatically adapts to network changes. Recall how in Section 2.3 we dierenti-
ated between user delegation and administrative delegation, based on whether or not the
delegate possesses the rights he delegates. In the case of ReBAC, it is not necessary for
a delegate to possess the rights they delegate. As such, delegation in ReBAC is mostly
administrative.
Furthermore, ms does not need to amend her relational policy to accomodate for cl join-
ing the Malaysian network. The moment the latter happens, cl is part of the Malaysian
network and thus satises the existing relational policy set in place. This abstraction be-
tween joining an existing network and acquiring particular access rights in that network
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is one of ReBAC's greatest strengths in comparison to RBAC.
Taking our example a step further, consider Figure 4.4. In this new version of the joint
rescue team network, every country's leader is connected to every other country's leader
by a leader team member relation. Let us further assume that ms decides to change
access rights to the communal calendar, so that only the leaders of the countries involved
in the search can access the calendar.
ml
ms
mnm
cl
cs
cnm
Malaysian Network Relation (MN)
Chinese Network Relation (CN)
ml = Malaysian leader cl = Chinese leader
ms = Malaysian secretary cs = Chinese secretary
mnm = Malaysian network member cnm = Chinese network member
cl
Malaysian leader relation (ML)
Figure 4.4: The Chinese leader cl is now connected to the Malaysian leaderml as depicted
by the solid line(MN) and the dashed line(ML). cl is still part of both networks.
In order to do so, and with the knowledge that every country's leader is connected to
one another via a leader team member relation, the policy now takes the form:
ms:(ran:ML:1) (4.2)
The above abstract path policy is satised for any network member that shares a con-
nection path with the Malaysian secretary, and is also connected to someone in a ML
relationship. As seen in Figure 4.4, both ml and cl are connected via a ML relation, and
share a network path with ms. Notice once more the level of abstraction - the Malaysian
secretary is unaware as to whether or not there exist any pairs of users that satisfy
her revamped relational policy. This doesn't stop her from dening a relational policy
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that automatically adjusts to network changes, granting rights to users that satisfy its
relational composition.
ml
ms1 mnm1
Malaysian Network Relation (MN) Malaysian Network Member Relation(MNM)
ml = Malaysian leader
ms = Malaysian secretary
mnm = Malaysian network member
Malaysian Secretary Of Relation (SO)
ms2
mnm2
mnm3
Figure 4.5: A network depicting two dierent scenarios - the common connector scenario,
where two secretaries work under the same leader, and the clique scenario where three
network members are connected as part of a team.
As a nal example, we will display the simplicity and strength of our policy templates
by implementing two of Fong's more complicated templates - the k common connectors,
and the clique templates, as discussed in Section 4.3. Consider two dierent resources
- we will refer to them as Calendar1, and Calendar2. ms1 is responsible for regulating
access to Calendar1 and mnm1 is responsible for regulating access to Calendar2. With
regard to Calendar1, ms1 decides that anyone who acts as a secretary to the Malaysian
leader should have access to his calendar. With regard to Calendar2, anyone who is a
Malaysian team member of exactly three members, should have access to Calendar2 (to
the best of our knowledge and at the time of this writing, this relational policy cannot
be expressed by Carminati's policy language. Fong had to amend his policy language, as
discussed in Section 2.12, in order to accommodate for this case.)
Access to Calendar1 can be regulated by the following policy:
SO:SO:1 (4.3)
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The above policy states that for a pair of users (x; y), if both x and y are related to at
least one common user z by the Secretary-Of (SO) relation, y is allowed access to x's
resources. With regard to Figure 4.5, this means thatms2 is allowed access to Calendar1.
However, mnm1 does not satisfy the above relational policy and thus is not allowed access
to Calendar1. The following policy regulates access to Calendar2:
clique; 3; (4.4)
The above policy, constructed by mnm1, states that for a pair of users (x; y), y is allowed
to access x's resources if y is part of a clique of 3 members comprising x, y and any a
third user, regardless of the relations between the three. As we can see in Figure 4.5,
mnm1, mnm2 and mnm3 are part of such a clique. This means that mnm2 and mnm3
are allowed access to mnm1's Calendar2.
4.5 Comparison
The purpose of this section is to compare the use of our STReBAC notation in the
example of Section 4.4 with expressing the same policies using the notation of related
work. By doing so, we will be able to compare such notations to our own and exemplify
our belief that our model:
1. allows encapsulation - the intrinsics of our model are hidden from the policy admin-
istrator. Instead, a policy administrator can rely on our policy templates in order to
dene simple, non-verbose policy that capture a wide range of access requirements.
2. is easier to comprehend by the end user - our notation manages to express relational
expressions relatively simply, and it does not expect the end user to be familiar with
intrinsic mathematical terms.
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3. is not verbose despite a relation's level of complexity - our notation manages to
remain clean and simple to both type and maintain, regardless of the length of a
policy's relational chain.
In our example, equation (4.1) we used a Relational template to create a `Malaysian
Network' only policy and we illustrated this by demonstrating that a Malaysian Network
member's request was authorised since the policy was satised. In order for the policy
creator, ms, to ensure that anyone connected to her through a chain of mn relations
could access the resource, the use of transitive closure enabled us to dene a policy
that would be satised if there exists a connection between accessor y and owner x
comprising n number of MN connection steps, between owner and accessor. At the time
of writing, neither Fong nor Carminati could produce a policy that could encapsulate such
an abstract relation. Both Fong and Carminati's models were, at the time of writing,
explicit in their relational denitions, thus making them unable to dene a relational
policy of implicit steps.
In order to illustrate how our templates satisfy the bullet points of 4.5, consider the fol-
lowing requirement. ms needs to reconstruct her policy, to ensure that anyone connected
to her by an MN relation up to three steps away, has access to her calendar. Fong's
attempt to do this in B would result in the following attempt:
a _ hMNia _ hMNihMNia _ hMNihMNihMNia
Recall Figure 2.9, and our discussion of the circularity problem. Fong's B could not
tell the dierence between the two network paths displayed in Figure 2.9, and was thus
forced to amend his notation, introducing E. The above policy had to be re-written as:
a _ hMNia _@p:(:p ^ hMNihMNia) _@p:(:p ^ hMNi@y:(:y ^ hMNihMNia))
Notice the rising complexity in the above policy. We are using the newly introduced
E bound/unbound variables, as discussed in Section 2.12.2, to ensure that we avoid
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the circularity problem. Yet in a relational expression of just three hops, Fong's policy
has grown rather verbose and dicult to understand - therefore dicult to analyse.
The reason behind this, is Fong's choice to ignore encapsulation in his formal model.
Instead of providing the policy administrator with a clean, easy to understand interface
to create her policies, Fong forces her to physically write the policy herself, introducing
the possibility of human error in the policy denition. Furthermore, it is clear that the
larger number of hops required (e.g. an MN connection up to n explicit steps), would
exponentially increase the length and complexity of the policy denition.
Carminati's description, though easier to read due to its OWL/RDF format, is even
more verbose - at the time of writing, Carminati had to create three dierent policies to
capture our requirements for 3 policy hops. The policy itself would look as follows:
?MN(owner; subject1)^?Owns(owner; Calendar) =?Access(subject1; Calendar)
(?MN(owner; subject1)^?MN(subject1; subject2))^?Owns(owner; Calendar) =
?Access(subject2; Calendar)
((?MN(owner; subject1)^?MN(subject1; subject2)^?MN(subject2; subject3))
^?Owns(owner; Calendar) =?Access(subject3; Calendar)
Just as with Fong, Carminati's work suers from lack of encapsulation. Furthermore, her
notation does not assure us that the circularity problem, as discussed by Fong in [40], is
circumvented. As such, at the time of writing, Carminati's notation could not implement
the `Common Connector' and `Clique' requirements as introduced by Fong in [40]. Last,
but not least, we cannot help but point Carminati's model lack of separation of concerns.
The above policy is tied to a particular resource - in our case, Calendar. If the resource
owner wished to create a similar policy for another resource (e.g. Calendar2), they would
need to rewrite the above policy. This would result in maintaining two dierent policies
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that expressed identical conditions. Contrastingly to the above policy expressions, our
policy would be expressed as follows:
ms:MN3 (4.5)
Notice the lack of verboseness, as well as the simplicity in our policy's expression. It is
easily readable, identies the subject (ms) without concerning itself with the accessor,
or the resource, and it also identies the relation that needs be satised (MN), as well
as the number of distinct hops between the subject and the accessor the relation is valid
for. Encapsulation allows us to hide the policy template's formal denition from the
end users. Separation of concerns allows us to keep the policy and the target resource
separate, thus allowing us to use this policy on as many resources (or other network
entities such as other users) as often as we desire, making it easy to centrally update
the policy and have those changes apply to any entities associated with the policy per
se. As demonstrated in Section 4.3, we were able to satisfy Fong's `Common Connector'
and `Clique' requirements, in a non-verbose, simple manner that was easy to type and
comprehend. Thus, to summarise our work so far:
• We have introduced a notation that allows us to dene non-verbose policies.
• Our notation encapsulates complex formal denitions, hiding them from the policy
administrator - the policy administrator only needs concern herself with declaring
the relational policy that suits her needs.
• Our policy templates do not comprise objects - the same policy can be applied to
many dierent objects.
Flexible as our policy templates are, however, we still nd them lacking in functionality.
Specically:
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• We have assumed that when a policy is satised, it always `allows' access to an
object. We would like to introduce a version of our policy templates, where a
policy, when satised, can either allow or deny access to an object. Denying access
in a policy is the relational way of expressing the concept of using a blocked list
in RBAC. Such a concept is not about safeguarding policies for future use it is
about how to express clearly that some users should not be able to have access to
an object. In Table 2.3 we noted that expressing such a concept in RBAC was easy
but not so easy in ReBAC. We will demonstrate that our STReBAC appropach
can incorporate this cleanly in the next chapter. With reference to Chapter 3's
scenario, policy P-2 would be an example of where we would wish to express the
rst part of the policy using a template that supported denying access to those
immediately connected to the policy owner.
• We have assumed a single policy per object. We would like to be able to have
dierent policies for the same object, as well as some form of combining algorithm
that would provide us with a unary end result.
• We would like to create a hybrid model, which allows us to demonstrate that our
policy templates truly satisfy the concept of `separation of concerns', by being able
to seamlessly work with other popular access control models.
• We would like to provide an actual real world implementation of our policy tem-
plates, to demonstrate that our formal models can be implemented and evaluated
for real life access control needs.
In the following chapters, we will discuss and demonstrate our solutions to the above
problems.
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4.6 Discussion
We proposed a STReBAC model based on set theoretic notation. We identied a new
type of policy (abstract path template) that cannot be implemented by existing models
and we compared the simplicity of our policy construction with that of existing work.
Crampton et al. treats users and resources as equal entities inside a network [31]. This
approach allows for exibility in assigning ownership of resources to users. Combined
with Fong's [38] ownership function, we could hypothetically further enhance our policy
templates to include resource ownership, and our network to comprise both users and
resources. Our Relational template could be altered to the following denition:
R;O, where request (x; y) is authorised if (x; y) 2 R to access resource O
This raises the question of what sort of permission should be associated to a particular
resource. We will deal with this in Chapter 5 when we introduce attributes to deal with
permissions through linking with an extant attributed based model. This is more sensible
than extending the templates further as our goal is to provide an expressive template
language that was clear and simple. It enables use to support multiple-relationships
between entities.
We would also like to note that our Abstract path template bears no relation to Jason
Crampton et al.'s work of Path Conditions and Principal Matching [31]. In his work,
Crampton denes a model based on relational diagrams, however in order to evaluate au-
thorization rules he depends on path conditions (which are, in essence chains of relations
in a relational diagram) to principals (which are, authorization permissions assigned to
particular paths). Our denition of an abstract path template revolves around the par-
ticular denition of a policy template, and the term is merely synonymous to that used
by Crampton in his work. The benet of being able to model multiple-relationships will
become valuable when we explore cross-SN communication by allowing the combination
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of policies from dierent networks, and introducing cross network relationship mappings.
For example, a relationship in one network will have one meaning whilst in another net-
work a dierent relationship may have a comparable meaning. Therefore, we will expand
our notation to allow dierent network relationship types to map to one another, and we
may be able to achieve this using functional renaming. This will allow users to create
policies for cross network communication.
From the scenario, one could imagine that the SO and ML relations should be disjoint.
Typically in set theory one would write such a constraint as SO \ML = ;. Since our
relational templates are based on a relational grammar, it is clearly not appropriate to
augment the grammar with boolean operators. However, it is natural to want to express
policies which state that an authorisation is granted if a pair of (subject; accessor) is in
a relation or not in a relation. In order to achieve this, we shall see that we deal with this
in the next chapter by augmenting the templates with Permit and Deny annotations.
In the next Chapter, we will address multiple-relationships, as well as policy composi-
tion. We will also enforce the principle of separation of concerns [48], and discuss our
templates' compatibility with the SOLID design pattern [83] (Where each module has a
single responsibility, and is open for extension and integration with other modules). In
doing so, we will be able to combine our policy templates with the popular ABAC model,
thus paving the ground for formal policy language and its correspondent implementation,
which satisfy all the requirements discussed in Section 1.2. We conclude the chapter with
a comparative table in Table 4.1.
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Fong [38] Fong [39,
40]
Carminati [17] Carminati [19,
20]
STReBAC
Relationship Categories
Multiple Relationship
Types
X X X X
Directional Relationship X X X
U2U Relationship X X X X X
U2R Relationship X
Model Characteristics
Policy Individualisation X X X X X
User & Resource as a
Target
(partial)
Outgoing/Incoming
Action Policy
(partial)
Relationship Composition
Relationship Depth 0 to 2 0 to n 1 to n 1 to n 0 to n
Relationship
Composition
F , F of
F exact type
sequence
path same type exact type sequence exact type
sequence,
path pattern
of dier-
ent types,
depth-search
pattern
Policy Types
Relational X X X X X
Abstract path X
Common connectors X X
Cliques X X
Table 4.1: Comparison of our approach to Fong and Carminati.
Chapter 5
Hybrid Access Control
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 we introduced our STReBAC notation, and presented our work in creat-
ing a template-based ReBAC language that satised the following (and links back to
Section 1.2):
• It provides support for security policies for access control, and delegation to cater
for temporary transfer of access rights to agents acting on behalf of a client as
well as policies to express management activity - we have demonstrated our policy
templates, inclusive of delegation, by applying them to the scenario we discussed
in Chapter 3.
• The language is comprehensible and easy to use by policy users - we have managed
this by encapsulating formal denitions and providing a clean formal interface for
policy administrators to use.
Nevertheless, our initial model is missing several important properties for it to be con-
sidered a full stand-alone access control language. Specically, and once more according
to our discussion in Section 1.2, it should:
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• Oer structuring techniques to facilitate the specication of policies relating to
large systems with millions of objects. This implies the need for policies relating
to collections of objects rather than individual ones.
• Allow for composite policies which allow the basic security and management policies
relating to roles, to organisational units and to specic applications to be grouped.
Composite policies are essential to cater for the complexity of policy administration
in large enterprise information systems. We will consider this in terms of combining
algorithms.
• Make it possible to analyse policies for conicts and inconsistencies in the speci-
cation. In addition it should be possible to determine which policies apply to an
object or what objects a particular policy applies to. Declarative languages make
such analysis easier.
We will address these aims in this chapter. In our eort to adapt our model to the
above requirements, we discuss how popular non-ReBAC models manage to satisfy these
requirements. In multi-user computer systems, access control typically focuses on a user
and what actions they are allowed to perform and not on the relationships between users.
Consider again the example of Chapter 3. Let us assume that the Malaysian team
leader (ml) should have access to all Malaysian network members' (mnm) calendars
at any given time. In Section 2.9, we discussed how RBAC combines users, roles and
permission/object pairs in order to regulate access control. In RBAC, the notion of ml
is seen as a role of a user within a system. For a user to be able to read this information,
he would need to be in the ml role. ABAC, discussed in Section 2.10, would dene an
attribute called `role' (not to be confused with the RBAC approach; attributes in ABAC
are generic, and one can dene as many attributes as they desire), and would then assign
its value to be ml. The authorisation request would be granted for a user who has the
ml attribute, but it would not be granted for a user who does not.
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Considering RBAC and ABAC, we can see that the former is more tightly coupled - users,
roles and permission/object pairs are connected together. ABAC on the other hand oers
a far more generic, abstract approach in dening attribute/value pairs, an approach
that allows a policy administrator to incorporate as much information as she desires.
With that in mind, in this chapter we attempt to combine STReBAC with ABAC in
order to bridge the gap between a complete stand-alone policy language, and a complete
access control model which, despite enforcing separation of concern principles, manages
to implement the requirements that were missing from our previous work ( i.e., a mnm's
information can be accessed by an ml-attributed user, provided that both users belong
to the Malaysian network based on attribute information and are connected by a generic
Malaysian network connection MN (as was the case in Section 4.4)). Even this simple
example demonstrates that by providing a relationship view of access control we can
easily strengthen the authorisation policy to grant access only to users who have an MN
relationship with a particular user who's personnel information she wants to view. We
will show how this results in a stronger authorisation policy.
We propose a formal framework, which builds upon existing techniques instead of dening
a new logic since two formal languages already exist that have the necessary complemen-
tary strengths, namely STReBAC which we have discussed in the previous chapter, and
PTaCL [30]. PTaCL (named `p-tackle') denes a syntax and a semantics to provide a
formal evaluation method for requests and authorisation policies that are based on at-
tribute values. PTaCL is itself a combination of two languages, a policy target language
(PTL), which determines when a policy should be evaluated and in essence provides
attribute based access control, and a policy composition language (PCL) for dening
complex policies.
Our aim is to combine PTaCL with STReBAC - this new combination would enable the
clear separation of concerns between the relational and attribute evaluation of requests.
The power of this new combination means that it is possible to dene authorisation poli-
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cies based on attributes together with an alternative to role-based control if appropriate
in a particular system. The reason for our interest is that we wish to see a formal un-
derpinning that is applicable to the commonly used implementation of an access control
model, that is XACML 3.0 [43]. XACML is a framework that enables the specication
of complex policies based on attribute-based access control and contains a rich set of
attribute features to support requests. The evaluation of such requests with respect to
attribute authorisation policies in XACML 3.0 is based on an informal approach of com-
bining algorithms. Through the hybrid framework we present in this chapter we aim
to justify the possible adoption of relationship-based access control as a feature within
XACML 3.0 without further syntactic language extensions.
The theoretical contributions of the chapter are organised in the following sections. Sec-
tion 5.2 provides an introduction to PTaCL and its novel adaptation to support relation-
ship based evaluation. As mentioned above one of the contributions of this chapter is to
extend these relational templates from Chapter 4.1 in order to be able to work with open
systems. In Section 5.3 we detail these extensions. Section 5.4 illustrates the novel com-
bined use of the adapted PTaCL and extended STReBAC. It provides a worked example
which rst explores the process of dening individual access control polices in terms of
relationships and then combines it with a traditional attribute based evaluation. The
example explores how the framework is robust in the evaluation of requests when access
policies provide conicting results. A further contribution of the work is to extend new
the hybrid framework to multiple networks and to support cross-network access requests,
we will examine the eect they have on the existing users of the individual networks
and their policies. This novel extension is discussed in Section 5.6 and illustrates the
potential adaptability of our framework. We also extend the example from Section 5.4 to
a multiple network so that we can discuss the process of merging networks and the han-
dling of access control requests in their post-merged state. Finally, Section 5.7 provides
concluding remarks for the chapter.
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5.2 Evaluation framework
In this section we describe a language for formally evaluating access requests using an
adaptation of the language PTaCL, as stated earlier. PTaCL is made up of two languages:
a policy target language (PTL) and a policy composition language (PCL). In essence an
access request is written in terms of attributes and associated values, these attributes
and values are then validated with respect to targets using PTL. Policies are written
using targets and combining operators using PCL. Access requests and then evaluated
against policies to determine whether access is granted or not.
5.2.1 Review of PTaCL
We structure this section by rst reviewing the existing notation. We begin by describing
the access request format that we adopt from PTaCL. As we have discussed in Chap-
ter 2.2, typically access requests follow a subject-object-action triple, which are akin
to attribute value pairs in ABAC. However, the access request format supported by
PTaCL is more general. The authors of PTaCL argue that this generalisation allows for
more exibility so that the request need not always contain identiers for subjects, objects
and actions. This argument satises our previous Chapter discussion about separation
of concerns when it comes to dening a policy language.
In Chapter 4, a role in a relation diagram captured the notion of a user. In this chapter
since ml and mnm are being used to capture the notion of types of users we can now be
more explicit in assigning roles to users. The use of the role attribute means that the
policies within the system could lifted to a more abstract level and written in terms of
roles (or any other attribute for that matter). So consider a particular calendar request,
where the only details included are those of the resource, as well as those of the requester.
The details of the owner of that resource is not included in the request - instead, the
resource owner is included in the description of the policy which grants access to that
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resource. A typical format for an access request is as follows:
f(subject; bob); (role;ml); (network;Malaysian); (resource; calendar123); (action; read)g
(5.1)
where Bob, a Malaysian network user, sends the above request in order to request access
to the ms secretary's calendar (we call the resource calendar123 to easily identify it
throughout our examples). The fact that Bob has the ml role attribute is explicit in the
request. As we've pointed out, when making a request not all the information regarding
the accessor needs to be passed in the request (i.e., Bob's name could be omitted as part
of the request). We shall see in Section 5.3 that we can also abstract away from explicit
roles within access requests through our novel use of relationships.
Targets
Now let us consider the target language that provides the rules for matching targets
against requests. Targets are either atomic or a combination of atomic targets. Targets
form an essential component within authorisation policies that are dened in terms of
attributes and values. They provide the basis for controlling which policies are applicable
for particular requests.
A rule's target is dened either as an atomic target, or a combination of atomic targets.
PTL denes three types of atomic target [30] and four complex types of target operators;
we restate them here as follows:
• nullT is a target
• n is a target, where n is an attribute name;
• (n; v; f) is a target, where n is an attribute name, v is an attribute value, and f is
a binary predicate such as equals, or greater than, f can be omitted.
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JnullKTq = 1T
JnKT(;) = J(n; v)K(;) = ?T
JnKT(f(n0; v0) [ qg) =
8><>: 1T if n = n
0
JnKT(q n f(n0; v0)g) otherwise
J(n; v)KT(f(n0; v0) [ qg =
8>>>><>>>>:
1T if n = n
0, v = v0
0T
t J(n; v)KT(q) if n = n0, v 6= v0
J(n; v)KT(q n f(n0; v0)g) otherwiseJnotTtKT(q) = :JtKT(q)
JoptTtKT(q) =  JtKT(q)
Jt1andTt2KT(q) = Jt1KT(q) u Jt2KT(q)
Jt1orTt2KT(q) = Jt1KT(q) t Jt2KT(q)
Figure 5.1: Target Evaluation
The complex unary target operators are: optT t and notT t, where t is a target. The
binary target operators are: t1 andT t2 and t1 orT t2, where t1 and t2 are targets.
For example, ((role,ml) andT(resource; calendar123)) is a combined target for a role
attribute and a name/value pair for the resource. Let us consider the following target,
which allows read access to two dierent resources, calendar123 and calendar456 provided
certain conditions are met.
f(subject)andT((resource; calendar123)orT(resource; calendar456))andT(action; read)g
(5.2)
Targets need to be evaluated against requests and their evaluation contributes to the
evaluation of policies in Section 5.2.1; a policy is considered relevant to a request, if the
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policy's target matches the request's target. Evaluation of targets is dened inductively.
We need to restate the main evaluation denition from [30] in Figure 5.1. The notation
JtKT(q) is used to denote the evaluation of target t with respect to request q and we
ommit the subscript T on the operators for simplicity. The result of the evaluation is as an
element of DecT, which is the set of target evaluation decisions, i.e., DecT;= f1T; 0T;?Tg.
1T represents a request matching an atomic target, 0T represents that the attribute n
matches but the value v does not and ?T denotes that the request does not include the
attribute name n. Note, that u, t, t correspond to weak and strong Kleene operators,
respectively and
t to be the least upper bound operator on the set DecT. To illustrate
the use of these functions and operators, we consider the access request displayed in
equation ( 5.1) against the target dened in (5.2). The recursive evaluation works as
follows, starting from the left hand side of the target:
J(subject)andT((resource; calendar123)orT(resource; calendar456))andT(action; read)KT
f(subject; bob); (role;ml); (network;Malaysian)(resource; calendar123); (action; read)g =
J1T u ((resource; calendar123) t (resource; calendar456)) u (action; read)KT
f(subject; bob); (role;ml); (network;Malaysian)(resource; calendar123); (action; read)g =
J1T u (1T t 0T) u (action; read)KT
f(subject; bob); (role;ml); (network;Malaysian)(resource; calendar123); (action; read)g =
J1T u (1T t 0T) u 1TKT
f(subject; bob); (role;ml); (network;Malaysian)(resource; calendar123); (action; read)g =
1T
(5.3)
We evaluate request (5.1) against target (5.2), by recursively comparing each name/-
value pair of the request against each name/value pair of the target, starting from the
target's leftmost pair. If one of the request's name/value pairs matches one of the tar-
get's name value pairs, we replace the latter with 1T . If the name parts between request
and target match, but the value itself is dierent (as is the case with the request's
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(resource; calendar123) and the target's (resource; calendar456)), we replace the latter
with 0T . Otherwise, if no request name/value pair matches a particular target name/-
value pair, we substitute the latter with ?T . The end result is 1T .
Policies
The language of policies within PTaCL is PCL. A policy is dened either as atomic
policies and a combination of policies. In PCL atomic policies are dened to be:
• d
• (t; p), which is a restriction of the applicability of p with respect to target t.
where d; p 2 f1P; 0Pg.
For example, (role, ml andT(resource; calendar123); 1p) is a combined target for a role
attribute and a name and value pair for the resource and the calendar identier and the
policy is authorised to allow a ml to access the particular resource.
In PCL the following combining operators are used:
• notP p, where p is a policy,
• dbdpP p where p is a policy,
• p1 andP p2, where p1 and p2 are policies.
The evaluation of polices in PCL is with respect to a particular request. The notation
JpKP(q) denotes the evaluation of policy p respect to a request q. Akin to target eval-
uation, this is again dene recursively over the operators as we see in Figure 5.2. The
result of the evaluation is as an element of DecP, which is the set of policy evaluation
decisions, i.e., DecP;= f1P; 0P;?Pg. 1P represents a policy evaluation returning that the
request is authorised, 0P represents that the policy evaluation request is not authorised
(denied) and ?P means that the policy is not applicable to the request.
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JdKP(q) = fdg
JnotP pKP(q) = :(JpKP(q))
JdbdP pKP(q) =  (JpKP(q))
Jp1andP p2KP(q) = Jp1KP(q) u Jp2KP(q)
J(t; p)KP(q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
JpKP(q) if JtKT(q) = 1T
f?Pg if JtKT(q) = 0T
f?Pg [ JpKP(q) otherwise
Figure 5.2: PCL Policy Evaluation
Concerning policy matching, Crampton in [30] states that the eect of the weak com-
binations (
t) means that policy evaluation decisions that are combinations of ?P and
1P evaluate to 1P , whereas combinations of ?P and 0P evaluate to ?P . Conversely,
the strong combination (
u) of ?P and 1P evaluates to 1P , ?P and 0P evaluates to 0P .
The motivation for this strong combination was so that a malicious user who withheld
attributes could not manipulate the overall evaluation of a request with respect to a
complex policy, i.e. to yield an authorisation result as a consequence of one of its partial
evaluations returning an indeterminate, ?P , result.
A detailed discussion of the denition of these operators is given in [30]. Here, we need
only include the overall form of the evaluation denition so that we can subsequently
refer to it with ease.
Recall our request/target matching example (5.1) and (5.2). By appending our target
with an atomic policy (i.e, 1P ) produces the composite policy:
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Jp1orP p2KP(q) = Jp1KP(q) t Jp2KP(q)
JfaP(p1; p2)KP(q) =
8><>: Jp1KP(q) if Jp1KP(q) = 1Por Jp1KP(q) = 0PJp2KP(q) otherwiseJrKP(q) = fJrKR(q)g
J(t; r)KP(q) =
8><>: fJrKR(q)g ifJtKT(q) = 1Tf?Pg otherwise
Figure 5.3: Extended Policy Evaluation
J(((subject)andT((resource; calendar123)orT(resource; calendar456))andT(action; read)); 1P )K
(5.4)
Re-evaluating 5.1 against our composite policy 5.2 produces result (1T ; 1P ). The 1T nal
target result means that our policy returns 1P as a result. Any other case would resolve
in ?P .
The motivation for PTaCL was to provide a exible and very general operators in order to
be able to combine policies. The simplicity of its conjunctive operator, andP, essentially
represents a deny-override from XACML. In [30] they also provide an operator fa that
captures the concept of a rst-applicable combing algorithm. They dene this operator as
syntactic sugar based on other operators. In this chapter we provide a simpler denition
of rst-applicable in terms of explicit evaluation. We denote this as faP p . In this
chapter we additionally add the explicit combinator that allows use to dene permit-
override. This is achieved by including a combining operator to include a disjunction of
two policies: p1 orP p2, where p1 and p2 are policies. We consequently extend the policy
evaluations Figure 5.2 with our own denitions.
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Notably in Figure 5.3 we also include two policy evaluations that allow support for
relational evaluation. Relational evaluation is our new technique the enables relational
access control to be incorporated into PCL. The rst is an evaluation of a relational
template in the absence of additional attribute name and value pairs. Its evaluation uses
our new relational templates which we dene fully in Section 5.3. We write JrKR(q) to
denote the evaluation of a relational template r with respect to q. That is JrKR(q) 2 DecP.
The second evaluation, J(t; r)KR(q), is an evaluation of a relational template provided the
target is evaluated to be a match. Otherwise, the evaluation yields an indeterminate
result. The second evaluation is important because it is the key denition that supports
the hybrid evaluation of attributes and relations. This is achieved through both target
evaluation and relational evaluation.
5.3 Relational Templates
Recall from Section 5.2.1 that we made an authorisation request based on attribute value
pairs, where an attribute could include a subject and/or a role. Suppose we again made
a request as follows:
f(subject; bob); (Network;Malaysian);
(resource; calendar123); (action; read)g
where the rst attribute value pair is the subject making the request. In relational
terms, we refer to the subject as the accessor. Then, instead of explicitly including the
role within the attribute pair, we include a relationship within the policy to represent a
Malaysian network relationship between the owner of the policy that is granting access
to the particular resource and the subject/accessor who is wanting to access the resource.
Hence, in the above example, we could dene a relation called MN so that alice as the
policy owner can say that anyone she is connected to in the Malaysian network can have
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access to the calendar123 resource le. Hence, the above request would successfully yield
access upon evaluation of the policy.
Such a policy could be written as:
(((subject; bob); (Network;Malaysian);
(resource; calendar123); (action; read));
(MN; 1P )) = p1
and provides an example of the (t; r) policy and named p1 for convenience.
The following denes the dierent templates we support for the template relation r and
used in the extended policy evaluation framework. The rst relational evaluation is based
on a relational condition
J(R; d)KR(q) =
8><>: d if (x; y) 2 R and y 2 q?P otherwise (5.5)
We bind the accessor to be a specic attribute value pair within the request q. Note that
on page 73 we introduced a shorthand for policies specied by a particular user u, i.e.
u:R. Here we similarly adopt a short hand u:(t; r) which represents a policy specied
by user u 2 U such that u = x within the new relational r templates. This is why
alice would not need to explicitly captured in the (MN; 1P ). Therefore alice:p1 would
be policy p1 related to owner alice. The second evaluation is based on an abstract path
condition where the accessor is based on being related to another entity within the system
through the relation R. Furthermore, the other entity concerned must be connected to
the owner of the policy through some chain of the relations supported within the system.
J(ran;R; n; d)KR(q) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
d if (z; y) 2 R and
(x; z) 2 n for some
z 2 Uand y 2 q
?P otherwise
(5.6)
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The third evaluation is also based on an abstract path condition. It is analogous to the
previous template, the dierence being that the accessor and the owner of the policy is
connected via some chain of relations supported within the system but that the accessor
must then also be connected to another entity via the relation R.
J(dom;R; n; d)KR(q) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
d if (x; y) 2 nand there
exists z 2 Usuch that
(y; z) 2 R and y 2 q
?P otherwise
(5.7)
The k common connectors condition is written as:
J(R1; R2; k; d)KR(q) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
d if there are exactly k
users z such that
(x; z) 2 R1and
(z; y) 2 R2 and
y 2 q
?P otherwise
(5.8)
The clique is written as:
J(clique; k; d)KR(q) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
d if there is a set of k
distinct elements
fa0; : : : ; ak 1g
such that(ai; ai+1) 2 
for 0  i < k   1;
and(ak 1; a0) 2 ; and
x; y 2 fa0; : : : ; ak 1g
and y 2 q
?P otherwise
(5.9)
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5.4 Applying the hybrid framework to an example
In Section 4.5, we have discussed the privileges and shortcomings of our initial STReBAC
model. We then proceeded to introduce a hybrid notation that comprised STReBAC
and PTaCL (PTaCL) that would help us overcome our model's shortcomings. In this
section, we will illustrate our new notation's eectiveness by tackling two problems that
could not be handled by our initial STReBAC notations. Specically:
• Multiple policy evaluation - We will provide with an example where multiple policies
need be evaluated for a single request.
• Hybrid model denitions - We will use both PTaCL and STReBAC in order to
associate subjects, objects and actions while making sure to maintain the concept
of `separation of concerns'.
ml
ms
mts
Malaysian Network Relation (MN)
ml = Malaysian leader
ms = Malaysian secretary
mts = Malaysian trainee secretary
Malaysian Trainee relation (MTN)
Figure 5.4: Malaysian member mts is connected to Malaysian member ms with two
relations - MN and MTN .
Consider the following binary relation, which serves as an extension to the relations we
introduced in Section 4.4 and shown in Figure 5.4:
• MTN  UMUM , which models a Malaysian network relation between a Malaysian
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trainer member and a Malaysian trainee member (e.g. a head secretary, and a
trainee secretary).
We start by, once more, illustrating a typical use for the Relational template, which we
introduced in Section 4.3. Let us assume that ms is in charge of a communal calendar.
She wishes to allow calendar access to every member of the Malaysian network - provided
the member is not undergoing training. One way to go about this, would be to introduce
logical operators (:;^;_), and create a composite policy. Note that this is not a proper
logical denition, but rather an attempt to recreate Fong's relational language from
Section 2.12. This attempt would look as follows:
(ms:MN ^ (:(ms:MTN))):1P (5.10)
This solution, though plausible, contradicts our initial goals. Specically, we have in-
troduced new notation within our policy language in order to accommodate for more
complex policy expressions, thus going against our argument that a policy language
should be able to implement solutions to every access control problem without extending
its founding notation. Furthermore, by extending our notation, we have oered policy
administrators a tool for making their policies more complex than necessary. This makes
it harder for a policy administrator to analyse their policy for errors, and it allows extra
space for human error - the more complex the policy, the harder it is to ensure it is
performing as expected.
We could of course use standard theory notation, and rewrite the policy as as follows:
(ms:MN \ms:(MN  MTN)):1P (5.11)
This policy, though cleaner, still suers from a forementioned problem of clarity. Firstly,
we have introduced the set of all Malaysian network users related with the MN relation,
and then intersected it with the subtraction of MTN from MN , to ensure the accessor
is not allowed access if he or she is part of the training set. This approach, though
relatively simple it might seem confusing to the average policy administrator. Secondly,
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we were forced to include the set dierence symbol - though part of set theory, we have
not dened the   symbol as part of our initial STReBAC grammar. Lastly, the policy
is not easily reusable. The parts on either side of \ cannot be used on their own. Recall
how in Section 5.3 we re-introduced our policy templates by amending their declaration
interface to include a policy decision value, as well as combining algorithm operators,
which allow us to combine dierent policies together. One could argue that in doing so,
we have introduced new notation to our original STReBAC specication - this, however,
is untrue. Our policy language and grammar remains intact, and so do our original
policy templates. Instead of introducing notation as part of our policy language and
grammar, we use the PTaCL combining operators that allow us to combine multiple
policy templates. Hence the following policies declarations provide a solution to ms's
requirement:
p1 = ms:MN
:1P
p2 = ms:MTN:0P
p3 = p1andPp2
(5.12)
By using new relational templates and PTaCL's policy combining operators, we have
stayed true to the concept of atomic policies, where each policy comprises a relatively
simple relation. This prevents complex policy writing, and allows for ease of analysing
the relational part of a policy. Secondly, policies that operate on a simple relation can
be used indenitely due to that very simplicity, a fact that allows policy re-usability as
well as ease of policy maintenance. For example, let us consider that ms is responsible
for yet another Malaysian resource (i.e., MalaysianLogF ile). ms desires to allow access
to MalaysianLogF ile for every Malaysian network member. It is clear that the policy
fragment of equation 5.12 p1 already satises the requirements for regulating access to
MalaysianLogF ile. By keeping policies' relational expressions simple, we can reuse
the same policy either as stand-alone, or as part of a combined policy chain to handle
dierent scenarios. This helps us maintain a considerably fewer number of policies, as
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well as maintain the simplicity relational aspects of policies.
Unlike Carminati, as discussed in Section 2.12, whose notation has combined policy
language and objects, we have yet to provide with an example where objects are related to
policies. So far we have discussed ABAC in Section 2.10, and PTaCL [30] with the former
being a generic, exible access control model and the latter being a formal representation
of ABAC, which allows the use of operators that combine targets and policies together.
In our eort to stay true to our original STReBAC notation, yet still be able to improve
it with functionality that allows policy combinations as well as associating resources to
policies, we combine ABAC, PTaCL and STReBAC as follows:
ms’s file list
Calendar
MalaysianLogF ile
ml
ms
mts
Malaysian Network Relation (MN)
ml = Malaysian leader
ms = Malaysian secretary
mts = Malaysian trainee secretary
Malaysian Trainee relation (MTN)
Figure 5.5: We display ms's le list. We abstract from directly tying a user to a collec-
tion of objects; instead, we provide this illustration to better discuss our hybrid model
example.
In Section 5.2.1, we discussed an example of combining atomic policies and targets (5.4).
In that example, an atomic policy result (1P ) was returned based on matching a sample
request (5.1) against a sample target (5.2). In our hybrid model, we will be creating a
new target/policy combination by using our modied STReBAC templates. Consider
our example so far. mts wishes to read a resource under ms's responsibility. The user
has dened the policies responsible for handling access requests, but there has been no
explicit tie of the policies to ms's calendar, or the action performed on the calendar. We
can now alter our rst attempt to produce the following collection of targets and policies:
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t1 = (subject)andT((resource; calendar)orT(resource;MalaysianLogF ile))
andT(action; read)
p1 = ms:MN
:1P
p2 = ms:MTN:0P
p3 = p1andPp2
p4 = (t1; p3)
(5.13)
Our new notation, as introduced in Figure 5.3 allows us to bind targets to our STReBAC
policy templates. Our policy templates then, when evaluated, return a result in the form
of 1P ; 0P ;?P . At this point, we would like to note the dierence between the ?P returned
by the original PTaCL target/request matching, and the ?P returned by our modied
policy templates. The former occurs when a target's name/value pair fails to be matched
by a request's name/value pairs. The latter occurs when a policy template's relational
expression is not matched by the accessor and the policy owner. To illustrate this,
consider the following scenario. ml, from Figure 5.5 requests access to ms's calendar.
The request, which includes ms's credentials, is written as follows:
f(subject;ml); (network;Malaysian); (resource; calendar); (action; read)g (5.14)
Then, in order for ml to request access to ms's calendar, ml sends his request for testing
against ms's hybrid policy:
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Jp4KP
f(subject;ml); (network;Malaysian); (resource; calendar); (action; read)g
= J(1T u (1T t ?T ) u 1T ); (ms:MN:1P ums:MTN:0P )KP
f(subject;ml); (network;Malaysian); (resource; calendar); (action; read)g
= J1T ; (ms:MN:1P ums:MTN:0P )KP
f(subject;ml); (network;Malaysian); (resource; calendar); (action; read)g
= J1T ; (1P u ?P )KP
f(subject;ml); (network;Malaysian); (resource; calendar); (action; read)g
= 1P
(5.15)
Examining the request/target matching process of equation 5.15, we notice a few things:
1. Not all of the request's name/value pairs are relevant to the target - We
can see that ml has included the (network;Malaysian) pair, which is not included
in ms's target. ml cannot know beforehand the name/value pairs required for his
request, and is thus forced to send every name/value pair that he possesses.
2. Target/request matches get evaluated prior to our policy templates -
Our hybrid model follows PTaCL's original sequence. An incoming request is rst
matched against a target. Our policy templates are evaluated if and only if the
request/target matching returns 1T .
3. Our relational delegation remains intact - In Section 4.4 we discussed rela-
tional delegation, and how STReBAC follows the Administrative delegation pattern
(as discussed in Section 2.3). Separation of concerns ensures that our policy tem-
plates delegation is not impaired by this new, hybrid model - the reason behind this,
is that our policy templates get evaluated only after request/target matching has
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occured. Similarly, once request/target matching has occurred, we do not concern
ourselves further with the ABAC model - our STReBAC model takes control.
5.5 Relational Evaluation in Multiple Networks
In this section we explore what is meant by evaluating access control policies across
networks. The motivation for this is that when we have multiple networks, for example
network A and network B, that have dierent relational tables, we want to extend the
scope of policies in network A to evaluate requests from subjects of network B.
Thus, we need to review and amend our denitions in order to ensure that they can be
interpreted in the context of multiple networks. Our aim is to be able to dierentiate
between the relationships that exist between networks. However, there may be situations
when relationships that are uniquely named in dierent networks should be considered
equivalent when evaluating requests across networks. For example, a relationship friend
in network A is considered to be equivalent to the amigo relationship in network B.
Hence, consider three subjects: subject x is in network A, subject z is an entity in both
networks and subject y is network B, where (x; z) 2 friend and (z; y) 2 amigo. Subject x
has a policy which grants access to a particular resource provided the subjects requesting
access satisfy the friend;friend relationship. Hence, subject y would granted to access to
this resource since the relationships are equivalent. The novelty of being able to evaluate
relationships in this way is that not all subjects from network B need to join network
A in order to be granted access. Hence, this is a lightweight approach to extending the
scope of evaluation across networks without enrolling all subjects from one network in
the other network before evaluating appropriate policies.
In this section we use a dynamic binding  to map relations to their dynamic values, i.e.,
the value of the relations depend on whether we need to take into account that some
relations mean the same as other relations when multiple networks are being considered.
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It is not quite the same as in denotational semantics where  is used to map names to
their values. Here, we simply use  to represent the dynamic value of the relation within
the context of the networks where the relation exists, but it is in essence mapping the
relation to its dynamic value. We dene  : R 7! . In our example, when evaluating
the friend relation soley in network A we dene  as follows: JfriendK = friend,
when evaluating the friend relation across network A and B we dene  as follows:
JfriendK = friend [ amigo and similarly for amigo, JamigoK = friend [ amigo.
Therefore, in this thesis we consider one global environment binding. Relations which
have the same name in more than one network is considered to be the same relation.
It may be possible to consider an environment binding for each network. In this way
networks A and B could discriminate between the friend and amigo relation. For example,
AJfriendK = friend[ amigo whereas BJamigoK = amigo but in this thesis we wanted
to keep the environment binding as a straightforward global concept.
Thus, redening the relational templates in the context of an environment binding means
evaluating the relation in the context of the environment binding as follows:
J(R; d)KR(q) =
8><>: d if (x; y) 2 JRK and y 2 q?P otherwise (5.16)
The second evaluation is based on an abstract path condition
J(ran; n; d)KR(q) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
d if (z; y) 2 JRK and
(x; z) 2 n for some
z 2 Uand y 2 q
?P otherwise
(5.17)
The third evaluation is also based on an abstract path condition
J(dom; n)KR(q) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
d if (x; y) 2 nand there
exists z 2 Usuch that
(y; z) 2 JRK and y 2 q
?P otherwise
(5.18)
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The k common connectors condition is written as:
J(R1; R2; k; d)KR(q) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
d if there are exactly k
users z such that
(x; z) 2 JR1Kand
(z; y) 2 JR2K and
y 2 q
?P otherwise
(5.19)
The clique is written as:
J(clique; k; d)KR(q) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
d if there is a set of k
distinct elements
fa0; : : : ; ak 1g
such that(ai; ai+1) 2 JK
for 0  i < k   1;
and(ak 1; a0) 2 JK; and
x; y 2 fa0; : : : ; ak 1g
and y 2 q
?P otherwise
(5.20)
On page 101 we introduced two evaluation equations for our templates so that the tem-
plates could be evaluated within an extended PTaCL framework. We restate them here
but they are not required to change because the use of  is already included locally within
the revised template denitions above.
JrKP(q) = fJrKR(q)g (5.21)
J(t; r)KP(q) =
8><>: fJrKR(q)g ifJtKT(q) = 1Tf?Pg otherwise (5.22)
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5.6 Applying the hybrid framework to an extended exam-
ple
In this section, we will demonstrate our model's adaptability when applied to multiple
networks. Let us reconsider the example from the scenario presented in Chapter 3 which
was made up of two networks: a Malaysian network and a Chinese network. In Sec-
tion 4.4 we introduced two relations CN and MN which we to relate members of the
dierent networks, i.e., each network has a generic relation that connects every network
member pairwise.. There are also more discriminating relations MT ,ML and SO which
related to members which possessed specic attributes. In this section we modify the
networks' relation denitions slightly in order to further demonstrate the complexity aris-
ing from considering multiple networks access control regulation. Specically, we remove
the Malaysian network's SO relation and in its place we introduce the following two
relations:
• SOM MN , which models a Malaysian Secretary-Of relation shared between some
Malaysian network members, and the Malaysian network's leader.
• SOC  CN , which models a Chinese Secretary-Of relation shared between some
Chinese network members, and the Chinese network's leader.
Despite their similar name, the two relations are distinct and each relation is applicable
to its particular network. Consider Figure 5.6, which illustrates a new state of the
Malaysian-Chinese network discussed in Chapter 4. In this revised scenario we assume
that when the two networks merge, that is, their members can reach one another through
network connection paths (i.e., with cl belonging in both networks, a network path bridge
is created between the Malaysian and Chinese network). Nonetheless, the two relations:
SOM and SOC are both secretary-of relations, identical in nature, but each belonging to
its respective network. Finally, MN and CN remain unchanged.
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ml
ms
mnm
cl
cs
cnm
Malaysian Network Relation (MN) Chinese Network Relation (CN)
ml = Malaysian leader cl = Chinese leader
ms = Malaysian secretary cs = Chinese secretary
mnm = Malaysian network member cnm = Chinese network member
Malaysian Secretary Of Relation (SOM )Chinese Secretary Of Relation (SOC)
Figure 5.6: In the above diagram, we observe the following: cl belongs in both Malaysian
and Chinese networks. Both cl and ms are related to at least one more member, the
latter being in a `secretary-of' relation with them.
We consider the following challenges:
1. After the two networks' merge, we would like for two (or more) distinct network
relations to merge as one. We will demonstrate how this would allow existing
distinct network policies to adapt to network changes dynamically.
2. After the networks' merge, distinct relations should remain distinct unless they fall
under the previous rule.
For the rst challenge, we discuss how our hybrid policies can benet from network
merging. The idea behind network merging, is that two networks can have some of their
distinct relation sets unite. Let us consider our case. So far, we have considered the
following binding of relations:
(MN) =MN
(CN) = CN
(SOM ) = SOM
(SOC) = SOC
(5.23)
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We assume that prior to two (or more) networks merge, each network's administrators
discuss a common merge pattern. That is, they agree on what relations will be mapped,
as well as to what members would, potentially, relate to one another. With this in mind,
and to display how relational policies can benet from such a strategy we assume that
the following is common knowledge to all Malaysian network members:
1. Every leader is directly connected to a leader
2. Every leader has at least one secretary in their local network
We assume that ms wishes to create a policy for a resource calendar, one which would
allow access to every leader's secretaries. Prior to any network merge, we assume that
there is only one leader to consider, ml, and his only secretary is ms. ms creates the
following policy:
ms:(ran; (SOM ); 2):1P (5.24)
After the networks merge, the  binding environments are updated as follows:
(MN) =MN [ CN
(CN) = CN [MN
(SOM ) = SOM [ SOC
(SOC) = SOC [ SOM
(5.25)
Consider Figure 5.6 again. We can see how, given the new state of the networks, cs
satises ms's policy. Given our earlier assumptions, this means that whenever a net-
work leader and his secretary join the Malaysian network by means of merging, the
latter would automatically satisfy ms's original policy. This shows that by changing the
dynamic bindings of the relations, the policies do not need to be changed and yet the
evaluation may change. Therefore, there is a separation between managing the relations
and managing the policies.
We now consider the second challenge. Suppose we wanted to keep the SOM and SOC
distinct so that the permission for cs was not granted for the policy dened by (5.24).
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Hence the  bindings for them remained as in the binding evaluation dened in (5.23).
In this case the request for cs to have access using the (5.24) policy would result in ?P .
In our examples, our networks have been based on sets of subjects and sets of relations,
where subjects have been network nodes and relations network edges between subjects.
We assume that when two networks merge, and unless otherwise specied, each networks'
underlying sets remain intact. With that in mind, unless some form of set merging occurs,
evaluating network policies before and after networks merging yields the same results.
We can demonstrate this through an example. Let us consider a policy of the following
form (we omit dening a target for simplicity's sake, since we're only concerned about
the actual policy template's relational evaluation).
ms:MN:1P (5.26)
This policy, created by ms, is satised by any subject connected to ms on a continuous
MN path of arbitrary length. There is no set merging between MN and CN following
the Chinese-Malaysian network merge, so if cnm was to be evaluated against this policy,
the result would be?P . Though this example is simple, its conclusion applies to relational
policies of arbitrary complexity. Relational policies base their results on the underlying
sets of subjects and relations they operate on. If those sets do not change, that is, if the
subject/object sets of networks merging remain distinct after the merge is done, then
policies depending on these sets remain unaected.
5.7 Discussion
In this chapter we extended our Chapter 4's STReBAC model, based on set theoretic
notation. We augmented our policy templates with return types based on the XACML
framework without altering our model's underlying grammar. Furthermore, we intro-
duced a hybrid model based on ABAC and STReBAC, using a combination of PTaCL
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and our own notation to evaluate policies dened in terms of our relational templates
which could deal with multiple networks. In doing so, we have maintained our initial
model's qualities - lack of verboseness, simplicity of expression and exibility while em-
powering it with ner grained granularity. The hybrid model is now able to provide a
formalisation of an augmented XACML framework that includes relational policies.
In the next chapter, we will produce an implementation of our hybrid model for simple
networks using the latest programming technologies.
Chapter 6
Implementation
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we illustrate our implementation for the policy templates we have dened
in Chapters 4 and 5. The chapter covers how to implement the relational templates
and the use of combining algorithms. It does not deal specically with the attribute
evaluation which are part of the attribute access control model within PTaCL framework
because they are already naturally included within an XACML framework. Hence their
illustration, it not considered to be a contribution of our research. Nonetheless, using
the attribute evaluation in XACML together with thes implementation we propose in
this chapter would give an overall implementation strategy for the full hybrid model
we presented in Chapter 5. In our work so far, we have emphasised ReBAC's abstract
and adaptable nature and the importance these two qualities play in separating ReBAC
from existing popular access control models. The purpose of our implementation in
this chapter is to validate the use of relationship based access control within XACML,
demonstrating that our relational templates can be implemented and used in combination
with combining access control algorithms.
We present our prototype which is based on the concept of separation of concerns [48]
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and includes multiple policies evaluation and policy set combining algorithms. An earlier
version of the implementation was completed as part of the student's industrial placement
with Thales UK Research and Technology. This ensured the implementation provided
for the thesis was appropriate for the industrial requirements of the company so that the
theoretical framework present was given a practical reference.
This chapter is structured to rst give an overview of our implementation model, including
a brief discussion of the technologies used in our development. These technologies are
used due to their industrial strength and exibility. We will then analyse each layer of
our application, including design patterns used and functions of interest. Finally, we will
demonstrate the important parts of our user interface, and explain its operation.
6.2 Application Overview
We begin by discussing our application's architecture and explain our choice of design
patterns. We then step through our application's architecture diagram and briey explain
the workow before describing each step in detail.
6.2.1 Application structure
The application is divided as is typical in a n-tier [64] layer business application:
• User Interface/API layer - this layer comprises a set of HTML pages that serve
as our model's UI, and a set of API that serve as our model's interface for other
applications to connect to.
• Business/Infrastructure layer - this layer acts as a proxy between the UI and Data
layers. It lters incoming ReBAC requests and forwards them to the data layer.
When receiving a response from the data layer, it forwards the response back to
the requesting party.
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Figure 6.1: Our demo's architecture
• Data Layer - this layer responsible for receiving requests from the business/infras-
tructure layer and forwarding them to the database. Upon receiving a response
from the database, it forwards it back to the business/infrastructure layer.
Our motivation for this structure is to provide our industrial sponsor, Thales UK, a
exible ReBAC implementation, which demonstrates the strengths of a ReBAC model
while allowing easy integration with any existing applications. As described above we
can use an n-tier design pattern that ensures an application is divided in logical layers
(e.g., presentation, business logic, data layer), and separation of concerns [48] ensures
that each layer and component in an application is self contained, and purely responsible
for its own role in that application. (e.g., HTML code should not contain business code,
and business code should not implement any data layer code). Figure 6.2 demonstrates
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our implementation approach. We have chosen Microsoft's Entity Framework (EF) [2]
as the bridge between data storage and data layer, because Entity Framework's abstract
nature allows us to use any data storage with our application, as well as switch data
storage. This decoupling ts well with our aim to be exible in our design. We will
discuss Entity Framework more in Section 6.2.5. Microsoft's Model View Controller
(MVC) [5] is used to implement our business layer, because MVC implements separation
of concerns by keeping the presentational and the business layer separate. This allows
us to expose a number of dierent APIs as well as a user-friendly UI without changing
anything in the business layer. We will discuss MVC more in subsection 6.2.4. Finally,
we have chosen Bootstrap [1] to implement our presentational layer. Bootstrap is a
device-friendly platform, which handles the tedious task of coding for dierent devices
(e.g., tablets, mobile phones, desktops). Doing so allows the user to access our ReBAC
module from any of her devices at any time. We elaborate on each of Bootstrap, MVC
and Entity Framework as follows:
6.2.2 SOAP, REST and their dierences
SOAP and REST are web-service protocols, which act as middleware between server
and client applications, bridging the gap between dierent programming languages and
allowing remote communication between dierent platforms.
REST is easier to use for the most part and is more exible. It has the following advan-
tages when compared to SOAP:
1. It does not require expensive tools require to interact with the Web service;
2. It has a smaller learning curve;
3. It is far more ecient (SOAP uses XML for all messages, REST can use smaller
message; formats)
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4. It is much faster (no extensive processing required);
5. It is closer to other Web technologies in design philosophy.
They both use the HTTP protocol to receive and process requests, but their fundamental
dierence lies in their format [66]. SOAP is based on the WSDL [6], which denes a
structured XML interface that server requests and responses are required to follow. The
benet of this approach, is that SOAP can be implemented by anyone without requiring
knowledge of the middleware system. Additionally, SOAP exposes an API of available
methods that clients can consume, as well as the return method types clients can expect
once their request has been dealt with. The downside of SOAP is the overhead required to
send and receive a message. Every request is padded with an additional SOAP `envelope'
of XML tags, as well as related SOAP headers. This adds volume to network-trac, which
can be undesired in some implementation cases. REST on the other hand, is not bound
by any form of pre-determined XML tags. The downside of this, is that the various
developing parties involved need to decide beforehand on the information exchanged, as
well as on the format of the messages used between their application. We have included
both SOAP and REST APIs as parts of our implementation. The dierence between
SOAP and REST in our example, is that with SOAP our implementation would need to
interact with SOAP services whereas with REST our implementation can act directly on
resources.
6.2.3 Bootstrap
Bootstrap is a design platform created and maintained by a group of programmers, who
are part of Twitter's [56] team. Bootstrap is a combination of CSS and Javascript that
allows developers to easily create a presentational layer, which is kept compatible with all
major browsers and devices at the time of writing. Using Bootstrap to help create a web
UI ensures that an end user will be able to use our implementation from his computer
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as well as from his tablet, or smartphone. Bootstrap has been designed in such a way
to auto-adjust the UI's presentation depending on the display device used; that is, our
web UI contents scale appropriately for display on smartphones, tablets, laptops and
desktops without us needing to handle the resizing programmatically. Since our original
implementation was created for Thales UK, we chose to use Bootstrap to help them
demonstrate ReBAC on a number of dierent devices.
6.2.4 MVC
We have used Microsoft's MVC [68] framework which in turn uses the MVC design
pattern to achieve a separation of concerns that is widely used in web applications. In a
MVC, a view is the presentational content returned as the result of a user request (e.g., an
HTML page, but it could also be a File content, an XML document, or anything else the
application developer desires). A controller is a programmatic component that chooses
which view maps to a particular request, and then returns that view to the requesting
user (e.g., an example of a request being: http://www.policytemplates/home/index -
'home' represents the controller , and 'index' represents the view. Finally, a model is the
programmatic component that holds information tied to a particular view and request
(e.g., a user requesting the URL: http://www.proles.com/Home/Prole/Alex would
invoke the following chain of events on the server: The 'home' controller would retrieve
the 'prole' view, and then return it along with the 'Alex' model, a class containing
Alex's name, age, employment records, and so on). MVC allows Thales UK, or any other
party interested in our demo, to only use the components they are interested in without
tying themselves to our entire architecture. More importantly it allow us to build on our
business layer to provide with new APIs as often as it is required since the UI/API layer
is decoupled from the business layer.
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6.2.5 Entity Framework
The data layer within an application is responsible for helping the application connect
and communicate with a database provider, which in turn is used to store and manipulate
application-specic information. While in theory it seems a simple task in reality it is
hard to implement. As an application evolves, it grows outside its original boundaries,
requiring the application developers to update their code to reect the application's needs
by writing new methods. Additionally, it is quite common for an application to require
communication with database providers from dierent vendors. In that event, application
developers are required to provide application methods to accommodate each dierent
vendor's provider, a process which results in duplicate code that is hard to maintain and
extend.
Entity Framework is an Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) wrapper developed by Mi-
crosoft for Microsoft's ADO .NET. It works as a bridge between an application and
database providers, and it provides a set of methods that perform most common database
operations, including inserting, updating, selecting, ltering and sorting. By incorporat-
ing Entity Framework in our code, we are spared the task of coding and maintaining
several dierent versions of a data layer. Instead, we use Entity Framework's ready
made methods to communicate with our back-end data storage. Despite its exibility,
Entity Framework cannot provide solutions to every data storage requirement. For those
cases we have created custom stored procedures that reside on the data storage and can
be called by Entity Framework directly without us needing to write additional code. We
will discuss this case in Section 6.5.
6.3 Metrics
Table 6.1 provides metrics for our implementation:
RelationalAccessDemo.DLL holds the majority of our code. It implements the controllers
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DLL Number
of classes
Number
of meth-
ods
Lines of
Code
RelationalAccessDemo.DLL 31 120 1669
RelationalAccessDemo.Domain.DLL 12 - 429
Table 6.1: Number of core classes and methods
that handle the web requests to our views, as well as our business code. Our business
code is responsible for the following actions:
• Receive user input and transform it into Transact-SQL (T-SQL), then associate it
to the respective policy. We will discuss this more in Section 6.4
• Perform ReBAC on a resource by evaluating all policies aliated with that resource,
and returning the result in a number of dierent formats. We will discuss this more
in Section 6.4.
• Administrate our ReBAC implementation. This includes administrating the users
in our database, the relations in our database as well as the relations between pairs
of users. Additionally, an administrator can create and edit resources, policy sets
and policies. We will discuss this more in Section 6.6.
It is important to comment on the small number of lines in our Domain.DLL. Entity
Framework has been an important building block in our application, by providing us with
auto-generated code, which maps on our application's data storage. This allows us to
interact with our data storage without needing to write a single line of code. Additionally,
Entity Framework's auto-generated code is automatically updated to reect changes on
the back-end data storage. With Entity Framework handling the communication between
data layer and data storage, we were able to focus on the core concepts of our application:
translating user input into T-SQL, and evaluating policies against a resource.
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6.4 Workow
In this section we will give a walkthrough of our implementation's main purpose, which
is the creation of policies, and the evaluation of ReBAC on a resource.
6.4.1 Creating a policy
Implementing our policy templates has been a challenging process. We had to consider
and overcome the following points in order to provide with an accurate implementation
of our formal models, as well as user convenience when it came to operating our demo
application:
• Ease of user input - Policies use user relations as part of their denition(e.g.,
Friend, or Friend of a Friend). When evaluating a policy, the policy's user relation
is tested against two users in order to return an evaluation result. This relation
needs to be in a T-SQL format in order for our stored procedures to utilize it,
however very few users are T-SQL savvy. Furthermore, a user would need to have
extensive knowledge of our database structure in order to write a T-SQL query.
• Flexibility of user input - We wanted to provide our users with complete freedom
when it comes to dening a policy. If we went for a strict function/stored procedure
approach, it would be hard to anticipate every possible user input.
When a user creates a policy, they need to dene a relation that is associated with that
policy. In a single-relation network like Facebook, this relation could be as simple as
'Friend', or more challenging, such as 'Friend of a Friend'. To this end, we dene a
siple grammar as follows: R ::= RjR and RjR or R. In a multi-relation network, the
complexity factor of user relations could rise signicantly (e.g., in a network with many
dierent relations, a relation between two users could be dened as 'Friend of a Colleague
of an Associate').
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Figure 6.2: Translating English into T-SQL
In this implementation the trasform from our grammar to T-SQL can simply be coded.
It would be interesting to consider a more systematic transformation of this. Figure 6.2
displays how a simple relation in English translates into a complex T-SQL query.
We have implemented a simple English to T-SQL mechanism that allows users to describe
relations in their native language. When a user presses the 'create' button, the policy's
information, including the user relation in native English, is sent back to our application
(see Figure 6.3). At that point our business code validates the user input (e.g., the user
using non-existent relation names, or non-existent keywords), and then translates it into
T-SQL, nally saving it and the rest of the policy information in the back end data
storage. This piece of T-SQL code will be used when a request to access a resource needs
to be evaluated. We will discuss this more in subsection 6.4.2.
A user can create as many policies as he wants, and every policy may belong to one or
more policy sets. With each policy having a unique relation attached to it, a user can
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Figure 6.3: Creating a policy
regulate detailed access to his resources.
6.4.2 ReBAC access control
We have implemented two versions of ReBAC. In our rst version we had created a one
to one relationship between policies and resources. A resource could only have one policy
associated with it, and a policy couldn't be assigned to more than one resource. When
satised, a policy would return an `access granted' result, whilst when not satised an
`access denied' result would be implied. Policies were stored in the data storage (see
Section 6.4.1), to be evaluated individually when a user requested access to a policy's
resource.
Though ecient for simple access control, this approach proved inecient for more com-
plicated tasks. The fact that policies had only one return type, `access granted', made
it hard to explicitly deny access to certain groups of users (e.g., in a network where the
only possible relation between users is `Friend of', we would be hard pressed to dene
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a policy that disallows a user's friends from accessing a resource). Having one policy
per resource denied us the exibility of assigning dierent polices on the same resource,
and prioritising each one of them according to our needs (e.g., we would like to have two
policies on the same resource. A `Friend of' policy, which permits access and a `Friend of
a Friend' policy, which denies access. By prioritising the rst policy over the second, we
could ensure that the user's friends would be able to access the user's resource, whereas
their friends would be denied access). Our second and current version solved the above
Figure 6.4: Requesting access to a resource
issues by introducing multiple policy return types, multiple policies per resource, policy
sets, and combining algorithms.
In our current version, a policy may be assigned two return types - permit, and deny.
This allows a user to create policies that block user groups from accessing a resource,
as well as policies that authorize resource access to certain user groups. In order to
avoid policy repetition, we have allowed a single policy to be assigned to many dierent
resources. This way a user does not have to rewrite the same policy in order to assign
it to every resource. It is important to note however, that we advise against assigning
a complex policy to many resources. Changing a policy would aect every resource as-
sociated with that particular policy, which in turn could result in unwanted evaluation
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results. To handle multiple policies evaluation, we adopted the XACML concepts of pol-
icy sets and combining algorithms. Similarly to XACML, a policy set may contain one
or more policies, and every policy set is assigned a combining algorithm. The policy set's
combining algorithm, is applied on the set of policy evaluation results, providing us with
one nal access control decision.
As seen in Figure 6.4, a user may request access to a resource either through our native
UI or a third-party application communicating with our API. The request, which would
contain the resource's ID and the requesting user's ID, is then passed to the business
layer of our application. The business layer uses the resource ID to retrieve the policy set
associated with the resource from the database. Similarly, it uses that policy set's ID to
retrieve all policies associated with that particular policy set from the database, as well
as the policy set's combining algorithm. The business layer then iterates through each
policy, and calls the appropriate policy stored procedure from the database, feeding it
the request's supplied parameters. After receiving a result for each policy, the combining
algorithm is applied on the set of results. Finally, the resulting value is evaluated and
used by the business layer to decide whether or not the requesting user is allowed access
to the requested resource.
6.5 Database
Figure 6.5 illustrates our database design. Every table in our database has the following
required elds:
• [TableName + ID] - the Table's primary key. The Key symbol next to the eld
identies the eld as a primary key eld; a unique entry which is incremented
linearly with each new eld added.
• [Name] - a name by which to identify an entry. This is a helper eld to help the
end user name his entry.
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• [Description] - a description by which to identify an entry. This is a helper eld
to help the end user describe his entry.
6.5.1 Foreign keys
A foreign key is a link from one table to another. The link's source table is the dependent
table, whereas the link target table is the primary table. Foreign keys are used by
dependent tables when one of their elds has a value equal to that of the primary key in
another table (e.g., imagine two tables, a User table, and a UserProle table. The User
table has one or more users, each one identied by a unique primary key entry UserID,
and every user has one prole associated with them. This means that the UserProle
table would have a UserID foreign key which maps to the UserID primary key of the User
table there are two reasons for this. First, every prole is required to be associated to a
user; second, foreign keys perform validation on values. This means that the UserProle
UserID eld could not have a value that does not already exist in the UserID eld of
the User table). When a line connects two tables, the `key' end of the line represents
the primary key table of a foreign key connection; the other end, represents the foreign
key end. For example, the line between tables `Policy' and `PolicyType' states that
every policy (Foreign Key end of the line) is required to have a policy type (Key symbol
primary key end of the line).
6.5.2 Table denitions
In this section we discuss the tables that comprise our database, as seen in Figure 6.5,
and describe each table's eld in detail.
Resource - the Resource table holds information about every resource in the ReBAC
system. Besides the basic elds, it has the following extra elds:
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1. ExernalAppID - an ID eld that represents a le generated by an external
application. This eld maps le IDs generated by an external application to
local IDs eld in our database. This way, an external application can send a
resource access request using its native resource ID, but our application is still
able to process it by mapping it to a locally stored ID.
2. UserID - this eld stores the ID of the user that created a Resource entry
3. PolicySetID - this eld stored the PolicySetID of the PolicySet associated
with the Resource entry. Every resource is associated to a Policy Set which in
turn hosts one to many Policies, each with a return type (Permit/Deny), and
a combining algorithm (Permit Override/Deny Override/First-Applicable) for
reducing the nal policy decision set to a single value.
User - the User table holds information about every User in our system. (e.g., Alice,
Bob)
Relation - the Relation table holds information about every User in our system. (e.g.,
Alice, Bob)
UserRelations - the UserRelations table is a mapping table between Users and Rela-
tions. It maps a User to many other users by many relations. It has the following
additional elds:
1. RelationID - this eld stores the relationID of the relation between two users
2. LeftID - this eld stores the UserID of the left-hand user of the above rela-
tionship.
3. RightID - this eld stores UserID of the right-hand user of the above rela-
tionship
PolicySet - the PolicySet table holds information about every policy set in the system.
It holds the following elds:
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Figure 6.5: Our database's design.
1. AlgorithmID - this eld stores the AlgorithmID of the Combining Algorithm
used by a policy set on a group of policy return values.
Algorithm - the Algorithm table holds information about the combining Algorithms
(Permit/Deny/First Applicable) used by policy sets to reduce their policies decision
set to a single value.
Policy - the Policy table holds information about the systems policies. It has the fol-
lowing additional elds.
1. PolicyTypeID - this eld stores the policy type ID of a particular policy
type; the available policy types, found in the PolicyTable, are: Relational,
Abstract Path, Common Connectors and Clique, as discussed in ??((Add
reference to our paper here).
2. RelationalInput - this eld stores a policy's relational information in native
language, as entered by the policy creator during the policy's creation. (e.g.,
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friend and friend, colleague or friend and friend)..
3. SqlInput - this eld stores the T-SQL form of the RelationalInput eld. Its
value is auto-generated by our business layer during policy creation, and relates
directly to the RelationalInput eld.
4. ReturnTypeID - this eld stores the value of the policy's ReturnTypeID,
which maps to the ReturnType table. Every policy has a return type, either a
Permit or Deny. If the policys relationalinput eld is satised, the appropriate
ReturnType is returned; NA is returned if the policy does not apply to a
particular request, and Indeterminate if something went wrong.
5. Length - this eld storesthe number of hops the policy is going to be executed
for (a relational Friends of Friends with a length of 3, will return : Friends
of Friends + Friends of Friends of Friends of Friends + Friends of Friends of
Friends of Friends of Friends of Friends).
PolicySetPolicyImportance - the PolicySetPolicyImportance table stores mappings
between policy sets and policies, concerning the importance a policy holds in a
particular policy set. A policy may belong to more than one policy set. As such, it
may hold a dierence importance factor in each policy set. For example, imagine
two policies pA and pB both of which belong in policy sets psA and psB, which
both use a rst-applicable combining algorithm this means, the rst policy that
evaluates into a Permit or Deny is considered as the policy sets nal decision and
every subsequent policy is discarded. In psA, psA has an importance factor of 1,
and psB an importance factor of 2. In psB, we decide to give psB an importance
factor of 1, and psA an importance factor of 2. This table allows us to assign
importance values to policies against each policy set they belong to.
1. PolicyID - this eld stores a PolicyID as a foreign key to the policy table. It
represents a policy entry.
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2. PolicySetID - this eld stores the PolicySetID as a foreign key to the policyset
table. It represents a policy set entry.
3. Importance - this eld stores the importance factor of a policy in a particular
policy set.
PolicySetPolicies -the PolicySetPolicies table stores mappings between policy sets and
policies. A policy can belong to many policy sets, and a policy set can belong to
many policies. This kind of table serves as a bridge for many-to-many relationships.
1. PolicyID - this eld stores a PolicyID as a foreign key to the policy table. It
represents a policy entry.
2. PolicySetID - this eld stores a PolicySetID as a foreign key to the policyset
table. It represents a policy set entry.
ReturnType - the ReturnType table strores the return types a policy can have. Cur-
rently, those types are Permit and Deny.
PolicyType - the PolicyType table stores information on the Policy templates available.
It has one additional eld:
1. SP - this eld stores the stored procedure aliated with a particular pol-
icy template. This stored procedure is used when a policy of this particular
template needs to be evaluated for an access request.
Logs -the Logs table is used to record every access request made in our system:
1. Result - this eld stores the nal result of a recorded request.
2. DateCreated - this eld stores the date and time the request was recorded.
3. RelationsAtTheTime - this eld stores the list of every relation between
the source owner and the user requesting access at the time of the request.
4. PolicySetName - this eld stores the policy set assigned to the resource at
the time of the request.
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5. PoliciesAtTheTime - this eld stores the list of policies used to evaluate the
request at the time of the request.
6. CombiningAlgorithmsAtTheTime - this eld stores the combining algo-
rithm user by the policy set at the time of the request.
7. LeftUserName - this eld stores the resource owner at the time of the re-
quest.
8. RightUserName - this eld stores the user requesting access at the time of
the request.
9. ResourceName - this eld stores the name of the resource in question.
6.5.3 Stored procedures
Transforming our templates into stored procedures has been a challenging process, be-
cause it meant converting formal methods into a dynamic query. Unlike a RBAC model,
where roles are independent of one another, a ReBAC model comprises policies which
contain relations of arbitrary length. Due to that arbitrary length, it is not possible to
have a static database function that could handle all access requests, because the rela-
tions passed as parameters would dier between requests (e.g., `friend' at one occasion,
`friend of friend' at another). To deal with this issue, we have coded a method which
translates native language input into a T-SQL query as discussed in Section 6.4.1.
Though we've included pseudo-algorithms for all our policy templates, we would like to
focus on two of the more interesting ones - the abstract path, and the clique templates.
Implementing the abstract path template was a challenging process. Unlike the rest of
our templates, the abstract path template explores every connection path originating
from the policy creator. This means that it could, potentially, take into account every
single connection in our relational database. This is a resource-heavy procedure, and
we had to make sure that no duplicate entries were recorded; as this could lead into an
innite loop of recursion. Implementing the clique template was challenging, because of
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the nature of the algorithm itself. In a clique template, we need to explore all network
paths which start and nish at the same user. In a relational database, this is achieved
by heavy use of dynamic queries that are created on the y when a stored procedure is
called. Following are the pseudo algorithms of all four of our policy templates:
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Algorithm 1 Abstract Path template
1: procedure Abstract Path(LeftID;RightID;QueryString)
2: Using the resource owner's ID, insert all UserIDs connected to the resource owner
into the RecursionResultsTable.
3: while TRUE do
4: Create a temporary table. Insert UserIDs that are connected to those in
RecursionResultsTable.
5: Add every user from the ResursionsResultTable to the SumResultsTable.
6: Delete every user from the RecursionResultsTable.
7: Insert into RecursionsResultTable every UserID connected to the UserIDs in
the temporary table, excluding those IDs already in the SumResultsTable (This pre-
vents duplicate entries).
8: if RecursionResultsTable:Length = 0 then . No more recursions.
9: Break . Exit the loop.
10: end if
11: end while
12: Execute . Execute our relational query - use the SumResultsTable as an input,
and store the output in the RelationsResultTable
13: end procedure
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Algorithm 2 Relational template
1: procedure Relational(LeftID;RightID;QueryString; Length)
2: while Counter < Length do
3: Execute relational query.
4: if RightID IN Results then
5: Break the loop, return 1
6: end if
7: increment Counter
8: end while
9: return 0
10: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Common connectors template
1: procedureCommon Connectors(LeftID;RightID;QueryString;NoOfConnectorsRequired)
2: Execute query for left user, insert results in Table A
3: Execute query for right user, insert results in Table B
4: Intersect Tables A and B
5: if Intersect Length  NoOfConnectorsRequired then
6: return 1
7: end if
8: return 0
9: end procedure
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Algorithm 4 Clique template
1: procedure Clique(LeftID;RightID;UserCount)
2: Create a query that nds all connection paths of length equal to UserCount, which
start and end with the same user.
3: Further narrow down that query to start and end with the LeftID user.
4: Create a temporary table with as many columns as the length of Clique we want
to investigate.Then execute our dynamic query and populate this table. This table
now contains every combination of cliques of length equal to UserCount.
5: Remove duplicate results (e.g., a clique of 5, with IDs 1-2-1-2-1 is not a real clique
of 5 unique users. We need to remove all occurences of such).
6: Finally, check every entry in our temporary table for any occurence of RightID.
If even one entry is found, this means the accessor is part of a clique .
7: end procedure
6.6 UI
In this section we will discuss the presentational layer of our implementation. We will
step through our UI's screens and give a detailed explanation of the purpose each screen
serves. As we progress from screen to screen, we will explain why we've chosen the
particular order of steps and how it ts with our implementation's concept.
6.6.1 Welcome Screen
The end user is greeted by a welcome screen, as seen in Figure 6.6, which comprises a
top menu and a labelled button that asks her to choose a resource for ReBAC control.
Since our implementation of ReBAC focuses around the policing of resources, our user
needs to choose a resource that she wants to enable for ReBAC control. By pressing the
`Choose a resource for ReBAC control', she is navigated to the resources screen.
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Figure 6.6: Our application's welcome screen.
6.6.2 Choosing a Resource
Figure 6.7: The user is asked to choose a resource for ReBAC control.
A user is prompted to select a resource, as seen in Figure 6.2, from her list of available
resources. A resource may already be under ReBAC control but once a user chooses
that resource, its previous aliations are reset and the resource is ready to have a new
policy set associated with it. In order to choose a policy set, the user needs to press
the `Choose a Policy Set' button, which takes her to the next screen. Our policy set
screen can be seen at Figure. As we have explained in Section 6.4, every resource needs
a policy set in order for it to be eligible for ReBAC.If this is the rst time our user uses
our ReBAC implementation, she will have to create a new policy set. A policy set works
as a container for policies. Once access to a resource is request, the policy set associated
with the resource is retrieved from the data storage and each of its policies is evaluated.
In order for a policy set to return a single evaluation result, the policy set needs to apply
a combining algorithm on the set of its policies results. A user is able to choose between
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Figure 6.8: The policy set selection screen.
three combining algorithms - Permit Override, Deny Override, and First Applicable. If
our user has used our implementation before, she is able to use an existing policy set for
her chosen resource. This saves the user trouble from re-creating policy sets with similar
policies but it also creates a danger: changing a policy set's combining algorithm, aects
every resource associated with that policy set. Once the user has chosen a policy set, she
is then taken to the policies screen.
6.6.3 Policies
Figure 6.9 shows a policy screen to add policies to a policy set. If our user has chosen
a new policy set in the previous screen, she will have to populate this policy set with
policies. This can be done either by adding policies from an existing pool of policies or
creating completely new policies. Just as a policy set can be assigned to many resources,
so can a policy be assigned to many policy sets. It is important to note, however, that
small changes in a policy may aect the result of every policy set that policy belongs to.
Should our user decide to create a new policy, she can press the `Or create a new policy'
button, and that will take her to our policy creation screen. Should the user choose to
create a new policy to add to the particular policy set, she would be shown the screen in
Figure 6.10 to create policies.
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Figure 6.9: A policy set's policies.
6.6.4 Creating a Policy
Figure 6.10: Creating a policy
When creating a policy some elds are required (e.g., the relational combination to be
evaluated between resource owner and accessor is a required eld), whereas others are
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implemented for the user's convenience (e.g. a policy name to help users identify dierent
policies, a short description to keep note of information relevant to a policy on the time
of creation). Below is the list of all the elds in the create policy screen.
• Name - a name for the policy.
• Length - an integer that species how many times the policy's relation will be
applied. (e.g., if the policy's relation is : friend of a friend, and the length is three,
the relation will be applied three times. The rst time it runs, it will return all the
friends of the user's friends. The second time, it will return the friends of friends
of the rst time's result set, etc.)
• Description - a description for the policy. The user can provide a friendly description
to remind herself of why she created the particular policy.
• Policy Type - the policy's template in accordance to our policy templates'. A policy
can either be of type relational, abstract path, common connectors or clique.
• Relational Combination - the relation that is associated with the particular policy.
The user inputs the relation in simple English (e.g., friend of friend), and the input
is then stored in T-SQL in the data storage.
• Return Type - the result of the policy if satised. A permit policy allows access
if the relational condition is satised, whereas a deny policy denies access if the
relational condition is satised. If the relational condition is not satised, the
policy returns a Not-Applicable value, indicating that it cannot reach a denite
decision.
6.6.5 Testing
Figure 6.11 shows a screen how testing policies are displayed. The testing screen, reached
by the Test option of the top bar menu, provides an easy way for the user to test the
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Figure 6.11: Our testing screen
eciency of their chosen policy set. On the upper left hand side the user is asked to
choose one of her resources, whereas on the right hand side she is asked to choose a user
to impersonate a request access on that resource. By pressing the `Test access to this
resource' button, the system checks to see if the requesting user is allowed access to the
resource. The UI displays an access granted or access failure label, depending on the
result, and creates a log entry with full information concerning the particular request. A
log screen, shown in Figure 6.12, displays useful information about a past request. Such
information includes the date the request was made, the resource of the request, the
owner of the resource, and many others. The screen also includes the policies active at
the particular time, as well as the results of each individually evaluated policy. Finally,
it displays the relations between the resource owner and the user requesting access at the
time of the request. The demonstrator was produced during the PhD and was further
integrated with the OBSCURE platform, which was developed through the EU Passive
project.
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Figure 6.12: Our log details screen
6.7 Summary
This chapter has implemented the relational templates as database tables and associated
store procedures. The management of the dynamic relationships between users and
resources is managed via a separate administrative panel which we have not included in
this chapter, since it simply manages the dynamic adding and deletion of relationships
within the database. It is not related to showing how the templates can be transformed
into an implementation. The chapter has also presented how a user interface supports
the creation and combining of policy sets for evaluation. The user interface is shown to
be exible so that policy sets can be adapted
We presented the creation of a policy and illustrated that our user interface supports the
translation of a policy written in structured English into a corresponding SQL query;
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this was a concrete application of Chapter 4. This chapter also showed that the data
base design was general enough to deal with policy sets and combining algorithms whose
theoretical framework was presented in Chapter 5. Since the application was built as
a tiered application the APIs developed for the SOAP and RESTful implementation
means that it can be used as a plug-in to an XACML access control framework so that
the framework can also include a relationship based access control mechanism.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This thesis has made a contribution to the evolution of ReBAC policy languages, based
on the policy language principles we discussed in Section 1.2, as illustrated below:
1. Provides support for security policies for access control, and delegation to cater for
temporary transfer of access rights to agents acting on behalf of a client as well as
policies to express management activity.
2. Oers structuring techniques to facilitate the specication of policies relating to
large systems with millions of objects. This implies the need for policies relating
to collections of objects rather than individual ones.
3. Allows for composite policies which allow the basic security and management poli-
cies relating to roles, to organisational units and to specic applications to be
grouped. Composite policies are essential to cater for the complexity of policy
administration in large enterprise information systems.
4. It must be possible to analyse policies for conicts and inconsistencies in the spec-
ication. In addition it should be possible to determine which policies apply to an
object or what objects a particular policy applies to. Declarative languages make
such analysis easier.
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5. Is extensible and able to cater for new types of policy that may arise in the future
and this can be supported by inheritance in an object-oriented language.
6. The language must be comprehensible and easy to use by policy users.
To that end, our aim was to create a relational policy language, STReBAC, to meet the
above goals. We have further enriched our policy language by extending its functionality
while leaving its original grammar intact. This has allowed us to combine our policy
language with a popular ABAC access control model to provide policy administrators
with an alternative model, which is both hybrid and powerful in nature. We describe
what has been achieved by stepping through the chapters of the thesis again in the next
section and conclude with interesting areas of future work.
7.1 Contributions
The initial chapters provided the background research and a motivating scenario which
we used throughout the thesis. In Chapter 4 we introduced our STReBAC policy model,
a model based on set theory notation and a set theory-based grammar. We discussed
how STReBAC is a simple to use, exible policy model that, unlike other popular ReBAC
models, is able to describe complex relational expressions lacking verboseness, denition
complexity and need for extending its basic notation. To illustrate this, we compared our
model with those by Fong [39], [40], [38] and Carminati [18], [17], [16], [20], [19], [22], [21], [23],
while also discussing how these models inspired our own model. We also discussed del-
egation in ReBAC models, and explained how STReBAC in particular falls under the
administrative delegation category (where a delegator does not necessarily possess the
rights she passes to the delegate,as dened by Crampton et al. [29]). Finally, we demon-
strated our model's adaptability by using it in a real world example which has troubled
authorities worldwide in the past few months, i.e., disappearance of a commercial ight.
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We proceeded to demonstrate how ReBAC is ideal when moderating an arbitrary dynamic
network of users, as well as when regulating access control over sensitive information.
Chapter 4 achieves the contribution to the rst two policy language principles. Because
the link between users and resources would be dened as relationships which would be
dynamically managed the temporary transfer of rights could be controlled via relation-
ships. The abstract nature of STReBAC made it possible to focus on relationships and
this gave an implicit way of referring to policies for collections of objects.
In Chapter 5, we provided an extended version of STReBAC, one that deals with our
initial model's shortcomings - specically, its inability to explicitly block subjects from
accessing an object, and its inability to provide ne granularity concerning the connection
between a policy object and its target object (i.e., the object actions a policy allows when
its relational expression is satised, or [49] which object(s) in particular is a policy tem-
plate associate with). To deal with the former issues, we developed the concept of `Permit'
and `Deny' policies in our policy templates, inspired by XACML's [82] return values. This
did not impose on our initial STReBAC model's grammar (which further imbued our ar-
gument, that a policy language should be extensible but not open for modication), but
it gave us ground to associate many policies with the same objects. For this, we used
XACML's combining algorithms method, along with our extension of PTaCL's [30] for-
mal implementation of the former, in order to provide a unary access control decision
after combining multiple policies together. This enabled us to enhance our model a step
further by combining it with the popular ABAC model, in order to further enhance access
control granularity. In doing so, we were able to assign our policy templates to specic
objects, as well as introduce further access control restrictions. Chapter 5 achieves the
contribution to the third and fourth policy language principles. STReBAC on its own did
not handle composite policies, nor did it deal with conicts between policies. It provided
the building blocks to be able to determine whether access should be granted based on a
relationship constraint. However, in combination with an ABAC model and the PTACL
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evaluation framework it supported determining \what objects a particular policy applies
to" and the analysis of policies for possible conicts and inconsistencies.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we demonstrated that our formal work on policy templates can be
implemented. Our implementation abided to today's industrial standards and popular
design patterns (i.e., SOLID [71], Separation of Concerns [48]), and employed some of the
latest technologies available (i.e., Microsoft's MVC [5], Entity Framework [2], REST [70],
SOAP [86], T-SQL [33]). We note our use of good practices and latest technologies in
creating the proof of concept. This chapter demonstrated our design approach (the n-
tier application), and discussed the pseudo-algorithms behind our policy templates. In
conclusion of the combination of theoretical contributions from Chapters 4 and 5 together
complement the software representation of our formal models as depicted in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6 achieves the contribution to the sixth policy language principle because we
demonstrate that the theory can easily be implemented within an XACML framework.
It also demonstrates that since evaluating relationships is a separate policy evaluation
executing, if more policies could be expressed in our template language then it would
also be extensible.
7.2 Future work
ReBAC is considered to be the most recent of access control models and combined with
to the constant growth of OSNs, there exist many opportunities for extending our work
as it has been presented in this thesis. In this thesis, even though we started out by being
motivated by OSNs, we have shown that our hybrid model allows us to consider appli-
cation domains other than OSNs. This motivation to extend ReBAC to other domains
echoed in a recent paper by Rizvi et al. [72].
In Chapter 4, we have introduced STReBAC and illustrated its usefulness by comparing
it to popular ReBAC models. Despite our model's strengths, there exist ReBAC concepts
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that our model has not yet taken into consideration. Kruk et al. [55], like Carminati,
discuss the concept of trust ratios. In essence, a trust ratio is applied on a relation
dened by two users and it represents the trustworthiness of a relation. We believe that
appending our templates with trust ratio in the future, would add an extra layer of
security that we think is would prove useful in the evaluation of relational policies. We
discussed administrative delegation, but it would be interesting to consider a STReBAC
model where users cannot delegate access rights they do not possess. It is our belief
that such an approach would tighten the model's security on one end, while reducing
its exibility on the other. Nevertheless, we believe that delegation is very important
to ReBAC as a model, and that providing the option for user delegation would further
enhance the exibility of our model.
We have provided a solid implementation of our relational model in Chapter 6, as a simple
RESTful implementation. We do not assume, by any means, that our implementations is
nely tuned. Our software engineering work merely serves to demonstrate that STReBAC
can be implemented and used on its own or as part of a larger system. We believe there is
plenty of space for improving the eciency of our code, in regards to speed of execution
and accuracy of results.
In Chapter 5, we have demonstrated the use of our work as part of a hybrid model based
on XACML's combining algorithms. We feel that XACML is slowly yet surely becoming
an industry standard as an access control framework, and as such would benet our
model to consider more of XACML's functionality. Interesting XACML concepts would
include a standardized set of name/value pairs (i.e., name/value pairs which include user
location control, time of day access). Additionally, we have illustrated the use of an access
control model based on ReBAC and ABAC. We would like to experiment with a hybrid
model comprising the ReBAC and RBAC access control models. The reason behind this
research curiosity, is that we believe our model to be exible enough to be combined with
any other type of access control paradigm. An additional interest could be to investigate
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whether there is an increased cost in terms of the time required to evaluate a wider range
of policies. We have seen that OSNs are modelled as edge-labelled directed graphs and
policies are really concerned with paths (and perhaps the existence of sub-graphs) within
those graphs. The computation complexity will come from nding sub-graphs. We will
investigate the complexity analysis of evaluating policies in our future work.
One area of research in access control is to validate access control models and in par-
ticular validate the consistency of policies. An example of this area of research can be
found in PEALT [49]. PEALT [49], is a tool implemented by Huth et.al. that specialises
in validating access control models. It has been used in both ReBAC and RBAC model
and we believe that its use would further improve our models. Another example of work
focused on validating access control models can be found in Ferrara et al.'s work [37].
The authors propose a verication technique and accompanying tool called VAC that au-
tomatically converts administrative RBAC policies to imperative programs that simulate
the policies both precisely and abstractly and supports the verication of the resulting
programs. Currently this work is based on RBAC models but we believe an interesting
avenue of future research could be to extend the VAC approach to operate on ReBAC
models based on STReBAC.
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